U.S. Naval shipbuilding claims settlement : 1974-1978. by Kesler, Gene Paul
U.S. NAVAL SHIPBUILDING CLAIMS SETTLEMENT:
1974 - 1978
Gene Paul Kesler
















Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
T1B8669

podiev Knox L"fi$CLAS S IF IED
SECURITY CL A1SIFIC ATION OF THIS PAGE fWliw Dm Cnr.r.d)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 1. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. Tl TLE end iubtltl.i
U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Claims
Settlement: 1974-1978
S. TYRE OF REPORT PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
March 19 79
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NuMIO
7. AUTHORS
Gene Paul Kesler
». CONTRACT OR GRANT NLMBCRr«J
t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO AODRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3940
12. REPORT OATE
March 19 79
U. NUMBER OF PAGES
189




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT lot (Ma *«porr)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT lot lha aaglracl mifrmd In Black 20. II dlllarmnt Irom Kamorx)
II. SURRLEMENTARY NOTE5
t». KEY WORDS IContlmia on rawarma gida II nacaaaarr and Ittmntttr by blecM nummwr)
shipbuilding claims . shipbuilding inflation
shipbuilding cost overruns contract disputes
claims settlement claims settlement
Public Law 85-804
20. ABSTRACT (Cantlmta on ratrarma tldm II nacamgaty an4 Idantltr or alaeM mamatr)
The 19 74 Seapower Subcommittee hearings, in part, expressed
concern over the $1.3 billion in shipbuilding claims then out-
standing and concluded that the existing procedures allowed
unacceptable delay in claims settlement. These claims grew to
over $2.7 billion before they were settled in 1973. In addition
to the nature of these claims, this thesis contains an investi-








SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Kntarad)

UNCLASSIFIED
(«euwT» CL*»ti>'C*TipM a* tmh »«mf»>». o.r. »««*•<>
Department of Defense to settle these claims: the 19 76
attempt to use P.L. 84-804, the Navy Claims Settlement
Board, and the negotiated settlements in 19 78. Case
studies are included for the claims from General Dynamics
Corp., Electric Boat Division, and Litton Industries, Inc.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Division. Finally, this thesis con-
cludes that changes in the nature of the shipbuilding '
industry, contracting methods and procurement policies
altered the nature of claims. Further, negotiated settlement,
using claims entitlement as a basis, proved an effective





S/N 0102-014-6601 2 ttc\t*\i* claudication o* t*i« rkatn*>-< o«r. s«i.,.di

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Claims Settlement: 1974 - 1978
by
Gene Paul Kesler
Commander, United 'states Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy', 1960
B.S.E.E., Naval Postgraduate School, 1966
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of






The 1974 Seapower Subconuni ttee hearings, in part, expressed
concern over the $1 . 3 billion in shipbuilding claims then out-
standing and concluded that the existing procedures allowed
unacceptable delay in claims settlement. These claims grew to
over $2.7 billion before they were settled in 19 78. In addition
to the nature of these claims, this thesis contains an investi-
gation of the three principal initiatives exercised within the
Department of Defense to settle these claims: the 1976 attempt
to use P.L. 85-804, the Navy Claims Settlement Board, and the
negotiated settlements in 19 78. Case studies are included for
the claims from General Dynamics Corp., Electric Boat Division,
and Litton Industries, Inc., Ingalls Shipbuilding Division.
Finally, this thesis concludes that changes in the nature of the
shipbuilding industry, contracting methods and procurement
policies altered the nature of claims. Further, negotiated
settlement, using claims entitlement as a basis, proved an
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A. SEAPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS 19 74
During a four month period extending into the fall of 19 74,
the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
held extensive hearings on the status of U.S. shipyards. The
hearings started with a review of the problems in naval ship-
yards, then proceeded to fully explore the problems in private
shipyards. The record of these proceedings encompasses over
1500 pages of testimony from numerous witnesses from both the
private shipbuilding industry and the Executive Branch of the
government. Witnesses from the private sector included the
President of the Shipbuilders Council of America, and several
top executives of shipbuilding corporations doing business with
the government. Testimony from the public sector was given by
several senior officials of the Navy and Defense Departments
including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Hyman G. Rickover
This testimony constitutes some of the bitterest and most
acrimonious to be found in the public record. Among other
matters, it highlighted the existing and deepening disagreement
between the Navy and the private shipbuilding sector concerning
a method of procuring new naval ships which, on the one hand,
would be fair and equitable to private contractors and, on the
other hand, would be timely, cost effective and efficient to
the Navy. An overall indication of the extent of this disagree-
ment can be gauged by the magnitude of the outstanding claims
13

against the government levied by private shipbuilders for ship
construction work completed or in process. At the time of
these hearings the aggregate value of these claims was an un-
precedented 1.2 billion dollars.
Industry leaders were forthright and strong in expressing
their views on the effects of failure to expeditiously settle
these claims. Mr. John P. Diesel, President of Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNSDC) , stated that:
. . . .we are now building 13 ships for the Navy -
two aircraft carriers, four frigates and seven submarines -
all nuclear powered. In addition we have agreements for
long lead time procurement work on two additional ships...
Unless the situation changes dramatically, we estimate
that after interest expense and taxes we will have vir-
tually no profit on all this work -- work which will
span a period of 5 to 7 years
.
Another dimension of this probeim is our loss of
ability to generate funds for those capital improve-
ments and additions necessary in a modern efficient
yard. To be a viable enterprise we must be able to
meet such requirements from depreciation charges and
net income. However, in 19 7 2 our depreciation and net
income failed to cover expenditures....
Becuase of funds held back under basic contract pro-
visions and out inability to promptly collect moneys
spent on additional work and changes, we are currently
financing over $115 million from borrowings with an
effective interest rate of almost 14 percent, these
borrowings currently cost $15 million per year
Except in very limited instances none of this amount
is recoverable under our present Navy contracts . In my
view this situation imposes an unconscionable burden
on us. We simply cannot and will-not continue to finance
work for the Navy to this extent.
Continuing his testimony, Mr. Diesel addressed the claims settle-
ment issue- more directly:
The Navy has utilized ground rules and standards of
proof which make equitable resolution of these matters
terribly time consuming. Settlement has sometimes been
delayed for years. In 19 72 we finally resolved a claim
14

in excess of $7 million relative to the aircraft carrier
RANGER which had been pending since 195 3 -- almost 14
years since it had been submitted to the Navy . There
is simply no workable mechanism in the Navy for prompt
evaluation and payment. The financial burden imposed
upon us by this situation, quite simply, has become
intolerable
.
Further pointed elaboration on the private sector's view of
this claims settlement issue is found in the testimony of Mr.
F. W. 0' Green, the President of Litton Industries:
The negotiation process has virtually stalled on
disputes where large amounts of money are involved,
or where there is a possibility of public controversy
over the Navy's decision. Settlement by negotiation
now requires as much or more proof than litigation. There
is little room in today's "negotiation" process for the
exercise of judgement, estimates and common sense. Endless
discussion, preparation of data in various forms, and
frequent reeducation of successive Navy negotiating teams
is the rule. It has been our experience that we not only
have to "prove" in a "negotiation" the positive aspects
of our claim, but our teams are also called upon to pro-
duce voluminous documentary evidence to disprove the
Navy's allegations.. This is all done in the context of
'negotiation'. The claims settlement procedures of the
Navy involve a system of review and the actions of nego-
tiating personnel at various levels. The result is sig-
nificant 'Monday morning quarterbacking' and diffusion
of authority ... .Shipbuilders presently have approximately
$1.2 billion on file with the Navy. Most of these claims
predate a time when interest costs were considered
allowable on claims filed. Therefore, it is estimated
that the Navy is presently benefiting from private
financing of the costs of its (shipbuilding) program
in an amount approaching $1 billion, with interest
expense borne by its contractors at the rate of 14%
per year. I further submit that this is not in the
best interest of the United States.
Clearly the American shipbuilding industry was extremely dis-
gruntled in their efforts to settle shipbuilding claims with th«
U.S. government.
By far the most extensive testimony by a public official in
representing an opposing view of this claims settlement issue
15

was that presented by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. He conceded
that some shipbuilders may be experiencing losses or at least
less profit than they originally anticipated on Navy contracts,
and stated that shipbuilders attributed these problems to infla-
tion, inappropriate defense procurement policies, improper
administration of shipbuilding contracts by the Navy and several
other reasons all of which, according to the shipbuilders, were
beyond their control, and therefore the fault of the Navy. Con-
tinuing, Admiral Rickover explained that commercial ships were
less complex to build than Navy warships. Faced with the un-
certain demands for Naval construction and optimistic projections
in the commercial market, some commercial shipbuilders opted
(and consequently overbooked) for this easier, government sub-
sidized commercial work. By contrast, Navy work, according to
shipbuilders, .was less profitable. In essence then, the ship-
builders wanted a guarantee that they would, under no circum-
stances, incur a loss. In pursuit of this goal, the shipbuilders
attempted to gain insurance by effectively changing the nature
of their contracts into cost-plus types — either through using
claims on existing contracts or through obtaining extracontractual
relief under Public Law 85-80 4. Further, according to Admiral
Rickover, some shipbuilders tried to gain their ends through
filing omnibus claims. The methodology employed was to care-
fully screen correspondence and other data over several years
with the objective of using this data to support future claims.
One strong basis of this tactic was to tie the claim to Navy
change orders, a process which, in effect, modified a ship under
16

construction after the original contract had been signed.
Admiral Rickover further noted that from the Navy point of view
these change orders are an inescapable necessity in order to
avoid unacceptable obsolescence while the construction process
run its protracted course, and to satisfy safe, reliable
operating criteria during the service life of the ship.
Moreover, Admiral Rickover indicated that in pursuit of
these tactics, private shipyards, their parent corporations,
and in some instances their Washington lobbies ts bombarded
senior Navy and Defense Department officials with complaints
that the low profit environment of naval construction caused
monumental cash drains and unacceptable cash flow problems
.
This methodology reflected attempts to short circuit the normal
claims process by purposefully injecting an unbalanced, incom-
plete and incorrect picture of the situation into the public
policy making process. In arriving at these low profit, un-
favorable cash flow allegations, Admiral Rickover cited that
one defense contractor had four different methods of recording
his current year contract profits and revenues , all lying with-
in the principles sanctioned by both the Accounting Principles
Board (officially known as the Cost Accounting Standards Board)
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Consequently,
the method chosen by a contractor to calculate and report his
profits could differ from contract to contract, and were to a
great extent, subject to the desires of corporate management.
This management decision concerning how costs are handled could
therefore have a substantial impact on a company's reported
17

profit. In view of this management perogative concerning
profit reporting methods, both the members of Congress and
Defense Department officials should not place credence in un-
verified financial data provided by shipbuilders and other
contractors
.
Continuing, Admiral Rickover noted that shipbuilders used
hundreds of lawyers and contract specialists in developing and
processing their claims. Conversely, he indicated that the
Navy experienced a severe manpower drain in the area of both
technical and legal specialists who had to conduct the detailed
evaluation of these claims. These same technical specialists
comprised the cadre of personnel who had to oversee the con-
struction of naval vessels; thus the dilution of their efforts
to process large volumes of claims was counterproductive to
the Navy's goal of obtaining the best ships possible within the
contractual agreements. Further, Admiral Rickover alleged that
shipbuilders frequently filed claims based on "innovative" or
unproven legal principles , were late in filing these claims
,
frequently failed to provide adequate supporting documentation
to properly evaluate the claims (thus causing delays in the
evaluation process) , and often revised or submitted additional
claims at various stages of the claims evaluation and adjudi-
cation process. All these practices, whether by design or cir-
cumstances, were counterproductive to the Navy's effort to
expedite the claims settlement process, and were not caused




Admiral Rickover also observed that for various reasons,
those in Navy circles who pointed up these contractor faults
were frequently labeled as meddlers; summing up his view of this
attitude with the characteristically wry comment that "we fre-
quently leave in peace the people who start the fire and molest
those who ring the alarm bell."
In partially refuting the above-expressed views, Mr. F.
Trowbridge vom Baur, a former Navy General Counsel, took the
position that:
The Navy's policy on many claims is a policy of
delay. The overall technique of many Navy administrators,
particularly those with an accounting background is to
keep requesting the shipbuilder for more and more
material. No amount of documentation furnished is
ever enough. Meanwhile, Navy personnel change, and
new contracting officers come into the act, until
finally much of what is requested has already been
furnished by the shipbuilder at some previous time
and has disappeared into the Navy files . The newer
contracting officers have never read all the documentation
previously furnished, and often do not even know what
it consists of or where it is located .... In my experience
it is impossible for a contractor to ...." frustrate the
Navy's review of claims." The Navy conducts its own
review of claims and the contractor simply has no
influence over what the Navy does. All he can do is
furnish the information the Navy requests, and hope
against hope for the best.
Who in government cares about this? Nobody cares
.
Its too big and too fragmented. There is simply no
moral tone in the Government today with respect to the
payment of claims. The Supreme Court ... .made some pointed
remarks about prompt payment of claims, saying that....
...the disputes clause is intended to provide quick and
efficient administrative remedy and to avoid vexatious
and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous
litigation. But the Supreme Court's strong language
appears not to have made an impression .... I submit that
it is certainly within the capacity of the Navy to cope
with, and, indeed, properly handle shipbuilders claims;
and also to take steps to prevent many of them from
arising in the future.
19

All shipbuilding claims being processed by the Navy at the
time of these hearings were either being pursued by the appro-
priate contracting officers, Supervisors of Shipbuilding Con-
versions and Repair, or specially appointed claims evaluation
teams, all under the cognizance of the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEASYSCOM) . Notwithstanding the opposing views presented
above, the Commander of this command, VADM R.C. Gooding, suc-
cinctly summed the Navy's position on claims settlement as follows
. . . .we are settling these claims in an entirely
legal and as well as we can in an equitable fashion....
It is a great impediment to businesslike relations with
shipbuilders to have these claims. We want them out of
the way. They will be settled properly, as quickly as
we can
q
do it properly, we will not give away the
store
.
In his subsequent testimony, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(DEPSECDEF) , Mr. W. P. Clements, Jr., further underscored this
view by establishing as a goal of the Navy the continuing
commitment to take aggressive steps to resolve equitably, the
large backlog of shipbuilding claims.
In December 19 74, the Seapower Subcommittee issued its final
report of these hearings. This document briefly summarized
the position of the shipbuilders regarding claims settlement
as: "They want their claims, just as they have been drafted,
paid in full and promptly." The Subcommittee concluded that
it could not approve the idea of merely paying any shipbuilder's
claim as submitted without a valid governmental decision as to
the propriety of the claim. From this central rationale flowed
three,of. the major conclusions of the Subcommittee which focus on




There have been long delays in the settlement of
shipbuilders' claims. In part, delays have been due to
the necessity of carefully considering each element of
complex claims, in part to the changing nature of con-:
tractor submissions; and in part to delays by shipbuilders
in producing evidence in support of these claims. Never-
theless the present procedures allow for unacceptable
delay in settlement of claims ... .Huge claims have been
submitted to the Navy in recent months and others are
threatened. These can only result in overwhelming those
responsible for the programs....
Unanticipated inflation has caused losses and led to
changes of substantial cost overruns. In the past the
Navy has been constrained from using realistic cost
estimates for future fiscal years, but more acceptable
procedures are now being permitted.
While the subcommittee appreciates that the margin of
profit for shipbuilders has not always been adequate on
naval combatant programs, assured profits cannot be
legislated and experience has proven that cost plus
contracts lead to abuses that cannot be prevented under
any procedures yet devised.
Obviously these hearings left the Navy and, indeed, the
Department of Defense with the charge for substantial introspection
regarding the existing claims settlement procedures, and a firm




Both the Navy and the Department of Defense responded
vigorously to this charge. Perhaps in a fashion all too typical
of our governmental process, boards, committees, and advisory
panels were convened or empowered to either study or take action
on these shipbuilding claims problems. From these efforts came
a mounting proliferation of reports , studies and recommendations
,
both within the congressional and the executive branches of the
government. By 1976 Congressman Bennet, Chairman of the Seapower
21

Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, noted with
concern that his staff alone had identified over 250 studies
on the weapons acquisition process produced since 19 70, with
12
seven of these being high level studies currently underway.
In responding to this concern, the CNO, Admiral Holloway, la-
mented that the Navy was making improvements, but that what the
Navy needed was a moratorium on directions in order to reorganize
and do things differently. He further noted that the Navy sim-
ply could not absorb such massive doses of advice and still get
on with its day to day business.
Even in the face of these very substantial efforts, the
shipbuilding claims continued to mount. By the end of 19 76
the aggregate value of these claims had risen to $2.3 billion,
and by 19 77 the claims amount was $2.7 billion. The magnitude
of these claims was an accurate bell weather of the extreme
and increasing disgruntlement of private industry towards the
Navy's ship acquisition process at that time. The media was
replete with charges from the private sector of unfairness and
inaction in this process. Threats of naval ship construction
cessation were not uncommon. Two contractors, NNSDC, and Litton
Industries, Inc., made good these threats by announcing the
stoppage of construction on a CVA and the LHA program respectively,
Only through court action was the Navy able to temporarily gain
the continuance of these construction efforts. An even deeper-
seeded forboding of this adversial relationship between the Navy
and private shipyards was the deteriorating interest by these
contractors in pursuing future naval construction work. For
22

example, the FFG-7, one of the Navy's largest planned procure-
ment efforts for surface warship programs, was of interest to
only two shipbuilders. This trend, if it continued, would force
the Navy even deeper into a sole source procurement situation
for new ships — a situation which would be disadvantageous both
from the standpoints of reducing the national naval/maritime
construction base, and moving towards monoply.
These difficulties did not, indeed could not, escape the
scrutiny of both the executive and congressional branches of
the government. In addition to numerous inquiries and hearings
on the status of these claims, the whole- ship acquisition process
came under close examination and criticism during each annual
budgetary process. In the executive branch, projected out-year
force levels drove the annual budget submission for new ships
construction (SCN) funds. While these force levels are driven
by broad national defense policy objectives , the rising price of
new ships undoubtedly exacerbated the decisions which continually
resulted in lesser quantities of ships than had been projected
1 4
to meet overall national goals." A frequently advanced rationale
for these reductions has been that the Navy itself was to blame
because it had allowed cost overruns, contractual disputes, and
mismanagement to reduce the shipbuilding program to such a state
of disarray. Meanwhile, on the congressional side, where the
Navy has traditionally drawn strong support for its programs, a
lengthy addition became an annual part of the naval testimony
in support of its annual budget submission. This addition was
a detailed explanation of the status and progress in settling
23

its shipbuilding claims. In 1976, an entire separate session
of the Senate Armed Services Committee was devoted to this
subject alone, as a part of its fiscal year 1977 budget authori-
zation deliberations. The general tone of these hearings under-
scored a growing congressional skepticism and concern over the
Navy's ability to manage its ship construction programs, the
health and viability of the private shipyards, the price of new
ships, and even, our national ability to afford a Navy to meet
our forecasted needs. The result of this skepticism has been
reflected in congressional support of the Presidential budget
for reduced quantities of ships. This reduced level of naval
construction, in some measure, aggravates the very problems
which caused it. Reduced construction levels engender less
competition, less economies of scale, and thus higher per-unit
prices.. To this extent the problem is cyclical and self-feeding
in nature; not caused by, but certainly highlighted and accen-
tuated by the claims settlement problem.
C. RESEARCH SCOPE
During 19 78 the vast majority of the Navy's shipbuilding
claims were settled. The principal claims during the period
from 1974-19 78 involved three contractors: Newport News Ship-
building and Drydock Company, Litton/Ingalls , and General
Dynamics/Electric Boat. In pursuing the settlement of these
-claims, the Navy and Defense Departments exercised several
initiatives. However, three emerged as the principal initiatives
pursued; all having the goal of expediting or improving the
claims settlement process itself. These initiatives were: the
24

1976 attempt by Secretary Clements to use Public Law 35-804,
the establishment of a Navy Claims Settlement Board (NCSB) under
RADM F.F. Manganero, and the 1978 negotiated settlement approach
of Secretary Hildalgo. The scope of this research effort is
limited to investigating these three initiatives. Therefore,
the principle research of this thesis is: What were the results
and impact of the Navy/Department of Defense's principal initia-
tives towards settling shipbuilding claims during the period
1974-1978?
D. LIMITATIONS
The shipbuilding claims problem may be viewed in three parts
lying on a continuum: the causes of the claims, the settlement
of the claims themselves, and the measures taken to avoid future
claims. The identification and isolation of the causes of
claims is important because only through this process can one
hope to develop alternative courses of action, and thus provide
a cure to the problem. The area of claims avoidance deals with
the application of the appropriate new procedures to effect this
cure.. In this context, improvement of the settlement process
itself must be viewed as a palliative, but, indeed, a non-trivial
one. As has been shown in the introduction, failure to find
and effectively apply this palliative results in increased ex-
penditure of vital manpower, increasingly counterproductive
tensions between the private and public sectors, and proliferation





As previously noted, the causes of claims and recommendations
for their future avoidance has been (and continues to be) ex-
tensively studied. However, some of the causes of claims cannot
be inexhorably separated from the settlement procedure. From
the Navy standpoint, many of the same personnel are involved both
in some part of the claims evaluation process and in overseeing
ship construction; thus forcing concurrent pursuit of the in-
compatible roles of confederate and adversary. The contractor
is thrust into a similar position in insuring that he does not
prejudice his potential for the generation of future claims.
This thesis is limited to addressing the causes of shipbuilding
claims only to the extent that they bear directly on the claims
settlement process itself. This limitation is imposed not
because claim causes are not important, but rather due to the
necessity of maintaining a central direction on the research
question itself.
Any treatment of claims settlement procedures must address
in some measure the legality of the available alternatives. The
focus of this research effort is to explore these legal aspects
only to the extent that they relate to the managerial decision
making process involved in the selection of the appropriate
claims settlement initiatives available to the public sector.
The tone of this effort will therefore be directed towards con-
tracting officers, Ships Acquisition Project Managers (SHAPM)
,
and their line managers in the Navy chain of command; and not




The principal research methods employed were a literature
search and personal interviews. The literature search encompassed
a review of the public records, periodicals, technical reports,
pertinent procurement regulations, related text books, limited
official correspondence, and a review of some relevant court
decisions. By far, the most fruitful of these sources were the
congressional hearings in the public record. Of particular
importance were two hearings: one before the Seapower Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee and the other before
Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these hearings were
conducted in August 19 78 and addressed proposed action under
Public Law 85-804 relating to the settlement of shipbuilding
claims. Of substantial significance were the annual congressional
authorization hearings. These were the primary reference sources
for the initiative of DEPSECDEF Clements to invoke Public Law
85-804 in 1976.
Personal interviews were conducted with both technical and
legal authorative sources associated with the Navy. These
sources are experts in the fields of government contracting and
claims evaluation, adjudication and settlement. All were deeply
involved in some facet of the matters under consideration in
this thesis. The questions posed during the interview process
were not uniform since each of the interviewees was associated
with different segments of the pertinent issues. These inter-





No personal interviews were conducted with the private
industry leaders associated with these issues. This was not an
oversight. Time and funding constraints precluded this avenue
of investigation. However, the 1974 Seapower Subcommittee
hearings addressed heretofore left little doubt in the author's
mind concerning either the viewpoint of private industry leaders
or their intended courses of actions. Additionally, local news-
paper accounts, and national periodicals were reviewed to assist
the author in obtaining this private sector view of the pertinent
issues
.
Another problem is associated with the very nature of the
issue being addressed herein -- that of the protracted nature
of the settlement procedure itself. Even with the relatively
short period of time under consideration, several of the naval
personnel, in particular, who associated earlier on with the
specific claims cases addressed herein had been transferred to
other assignments or retired — apparently taking their corporate
memory and/or records with them. Further, the public adminis-
tration changed in 19 76 bringing a new set of publicly-appointed
officials to bear on the issues. Therefore, of necessity, heavy
reliance has been placed on public records.
During the process of these settlements, some allegations
were made that a part of the claims were fraudulent. As a con-
sequence, a part of the records of these claims have been
impounded by the Justice Department. The records of the Navy
Claims Settlement Board were not available for public scrutiny.
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Thus the material addressed herein relies on limited public
records found in the congressional hearings, substantiated and
supplemented by the material provided by the board members
themselves
.
A final problem related to the Newport News Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company claim settlement. As no congressional hearings
were held on this subject, the data available on this settlement
was relatively limited. Thus, the material presented herein was
drawn from available accounts.
G. ORGANIZATION
This study is organized into three broad parts: a framework
(Chapter II) , a presentation and analysis of the data (Chapters
III and IV) , and a conclusions section (Chapter V) . Chapter II
'first explores the environment relevant to claims. The public
sector environment emphasizes the recent evolution and methodology
of the ship acquisition process, while the private sector environ-
ment focuses on the effects of conglomeration. Thereafter, the
nature of government contracts, claims, and settlement procedures
are addressed in turn. Significant effort is devoted to the
background and pertinent explanation of Public Law 35-804.
The data presentation and analysis section is divided into
two parts. The first part, Case Studies (Chapter III), addresses,
in turn, the background and critical issues associated with each
of two major claimants during this period: Litton/Ingalls and
GD/EB. The background section in each of these cases is
generally presented chronologically, except in instances where,
in the author's view, departures are necessary for clarity. The
29

second part of the data presentation and analysis section con-
cerns the settlement initiatives employed by both the Navy and
the Department of Defense. Initially addressed is the 1976
attempt by DEPSECDEF Clements to employ Public Law 85-804. Next,
the Navy Claims Settlement Board background and actions are
explored. Following this, the 19 77-19 78 negotiated settlement
efforts are pursued. These efforts are divided into the alter-
natives available, the settlements themselves, and the ensuing
actions necessary to convince Congress that this was the appro-
priate course of action.
Chapter V, the conclusions, draws on the data and analysis




CHAPTER II - FRAMEWORK
In their broadest context, shipbuilding claims are both a
result of and an integral part of the process of acquiring naval
ships. The intent of this chapter is to explore the claims
process in the context of this broad overview. First a brief
historical perspective of the weapons systems acquisition process
is presented. Attention is focused particularly on the ship
acquisition process, emphasizing the evolutionary nature of this
process over the past 20 years . Thereafter follows a brief
description of the methodology of this process, again emphasizing
the differences between the general process and that for
acquiring ships
.
The next section of this chapter focuses on the environment
of those who construct naval ships: the U.S. shipbuilding in-
dustry. The effects of the change in this industry from several
small firms to a few giant conglomerates is explored.
Next addressed is the legal interface between the public
and private sectors: the contracts themselves. Here, emphasis
is placed on risk elements and the most controversial contract
clauses during this period. The contract breakdown, or the
claims, are pursued in the next section, highlighting the
magnitude of these claims
.
Finally, this chapter looks at the procedures of the claims
settlement process. Procedures for grievance settlement both
within and outside the contract are addressed, with detailed
attention devoted to the use of Public Law 85-80 4.
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A. PUBLIC SECTOR: THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 15
Since World War II, the policies for acquiring weapons sys-
tems have undergone significant changes. To a great extent these
changes have been evolutionary and incremental in nature. None-
theless, three distinct policies can be identified — the "con-
ventional" policy period existing after World War II and extending
to 1961; the "concept formulation/contract definition" policy
of SECDEF McNamara which dominated the 1960's, and the present
policy which evolved under DEPSECDEF Packard in early 19 70. The
specifics of each of these policies differ significantly; however,
they all share the basic tenets -which must define any weapons
procurement policy: the identification of a need for the weapons
system; the establishment of system requirements; and the
selection, development, design, construction, test, and evalua-
tion of a weapons system which fulfills this requirement." In
this process, the Navy has the responsibilities of, through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifying the need, and of defining,
developing, and producing the systems to meet this need. Estab-
lishment of overall acquisition policy, validation of needs, and
monitoring the program progress and performance are the purview
of the Secretary of Defense.
Exhibit 1 presents a summary of the main characteristics
of these policies for each of the three periods identified above.
Before proceeding further, a note of caution is in order. When
reviewing this table, and throughout this paper, it must be borne
in mind that the timeframe for designing and procuring a naval






























































(post 1970) (industry acquisition development
















large numbers of the same type or class of ship may involve
multiple contracting efforts for follow-on contracts with either
the initial construction (lead) shipyard or a different one.
(The procurement blocks or groups of ships of the same class
are often termed "flights".) Further, the execution of some
claims settlement procedures require the alteration, modification,
or even the reforming of the original contract, in order to
equitably resolve a misunderstanding or to conform to revised
acquisition policies or both. The points here are that ship
acquisition is an extremely long undertaking and contracting is
a vital, dynamic process. Thus, caution should be exercised
when associating the major procurement of a large number of the
same type of ships with a specific acquisition policy. In this
thesis, such an association is inferred when a specific acqui-
sition policy is clearly identifiable as the root cause of a
claim or when the total procurement of a ship class lies wholly
within an acquisition policy period.
1.. The Conventional Era
Prior to World War II, ship systems were relatively
simple. They were essentially independent systems mounted on a
common hull platform, requiring neither extensive inter-system
integration nor sophisticated automatic modes of operation.
World War II saw a rapid technological boom, but this was a
protracted war of attrition. Numbers of hulls were important.
Therefore, although technology was beginning to have impact,
neither this technology nor cost was the driving constraint.
Rather, production schedule was the dominant factor which drove
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ship acquisitions. This quantity-driven policy was characterized
by decentralization, with construction contracts allocated by
the Navy to several shipyards to maintain the mobilization con-
struction base. At the end of this war, the Navy had an inven-
tory of nearly 5000 ships and over 50 commercial shipyards were
working at full capacity. Initial concerns of the post-war
period were focused, not on acquisition policies, but rather the
reduction and retirement of our war machine to an appropriate
peacetime level.
Spurred by its impetus from the war effort, technology
continued to advance rapidly. Words such as strategic missile
threat, nuclear age technology, and automation increasingly
became a part of our vernacular. The full cost impact of in-
corporating such systems into our ships was not recognized
since such modernizations were pursued on a limited, piecemeal
basis. Even into the 1950 's the Korean conflict, (which was
unanticipated) did not surface this full impact, as we pursued
a policy of ship reactivation to meet our expanded commitments,
with ships retirements ensuing again thereafter. Since the im-
pact of the technological impetus had not surfaced, the conven-
tional post World War II procurement policy for weapons systems
endured into the early 1960s. This "conventional" policy was
characterized by an interative design process essentially
accomplished by the Navy "in-house" with very limited independent,
contracted support, limited documentation, major emphasis on ships
performance, dividing of ships contracts between several ship-




Towards the end of this period the impact of technology and
its attendant cost began to be felt. The Navy established its
nuclear propulsion and Polaris missile programs. Complex anti-
submarine warfare systems were receiving high priority, and
our first surface ship guided missile systems were retrofitted
into existing hulls. The existing acquisition policy proved
unequal to these tasks, as evidenced by the acceleration of many
high priority (and high risk) programs resulting in an increase
in cost overruns, a lack of expected, or even adequate performance,
low effectiveness, delayed schedules and the proliferation of
"get well" programs.
2 . The Total Package Procurement Era
In 1961, SECDEF McNamara became the engine for many
changes in this acquisition process. One of his first acts was
to change the defense planning process by the introduction of
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) , and the
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) . These changes placed increased
emphasis on cost effectiveness, and technical capability, in-
cluding the considerations of operational readiness, reliability,
maintainability, logistic support and life cycle costs, rather
than just performance and initial acquisition costs. SECDEF
McNamara also initiated major changes through the introduction
of concept formulation/contract definition (CF/CD) procedures
leading to Total Package Procurement (TPP) . The prior policy
of allocation of contracts to shipyards was abandoned in favor
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of a policy of formally advertised fixed price bidding proce-
dures for ship procurements. Only cursory attention was devoted
to the concept of maintaining a broad shipbuilding mobilization
base. Major acquisition decision making authority was centralized
at the SECDEF level. In summary, the objectives of this new
..... . . 18
acquisition policy were:
1. optimization of cost effectiveness by using systems
analysis techniques;
2. reduction or elimination of contractor claims against
the government by using contractor-prepared performance-
oriented specifications instead of government-imposed
detailed specifications;
3. reduction of cost overruns by transferring financial
risk to the contractors for the design and acquisition
phases through the use of fixed-price contracts;
4. significant capitalization increases in shipbuilding
facilities by using multi-ship, multi-year contract
awards to a single shipbuilder that were expected to
provide long-term financial security; thus enabling
large scale capitalization and forcing expansion of
facilities due to delivery schedule demands;
5. reduction of unique system and subsystem proliferation
resulting from split production contracts
;
6. introduction of producability and innovation into the
designs by having the production contractor design the
system he was to produce;
7. lower acquisition costs by taking advantage of the
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"Learning Curve" effect through single-producer, serial
productions ; and
8. arrival at more accurate total cost estimates and the
reduction of poor ship support by making the contractor
responsible for all on-board systems, crew training,
initial repair parts and support facilities similar
to "Total Package" procurement.
Under the CF/CD process, Concept Formulation remained
essentially a Navy activity. This phase established the economic
and technical criteria on which to base the decision to enter
into an Engineering Development phase. The Contract Definition
phase provided the greatest departure from the "conventional"
policy. Where previously ship designs had been developed within
the Navy and then negotiated with several shipbuilders for con-
struction, Contract Definition called for the Navy to issue
Requests for Proposals (RFP) to selected capable shipbuilders.
The successful bidders from this process (usually two or three)
were then paid to produce ship designs . The construction con-
tract was then awarded to the single shipbuilder with the "best"
design. ("Best" was primarily the most cost-effective in the
context of TPP
.
) The single contract thereafter awarded was
for multi-year, multi-ship, fixed-price production, with or with-
out incentive clauses
.
This Navy CF/CD policy was an adaptation of the Total Package
Procurement program in use throughout the Department of Defense
for all weapons systems acquisition, and both developed severe
difficulties. By the late 1960s, reports of cost and schedule
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overruns and performance shortfalls of new major weapons systems
were found daily in the media. Contractor costs soared, profits
plummeted, and claims against the government mounted. The term
"contractor bailout" became prevalent as one defense contractor
after another threatened to cease production unless relief from
fixed-price contracts was forthcoming.
For both the Navy and the shipbuilder major problems emerged
with the CF/CD policy. The cost savings envisioned from more
efficient series production in a signle shipyard did not materi-
alize. Further, the inflation provision of the contracts of
this period were a major contributor to cost growth. This was
compounded by the inflation effects in both labor and material
for the large number of subcontractors involved. The overall
result of this acquisition policy and its associated contracting
methods was the generation of several shipbuilding claims during
recent recent years. The three such major claims are considered
in this thesis.
3. Current Era
For completeness, the current ship's acquisition policy
will be addressed briefly. This policy which was established
in 19 70 under DEPSECDEF Packard, strives to combine the best
features of the "conventional" policy with the lessons learned
from the CF/CD experience. At present, the major project con-
cerned is the Guided Missile Patrol Frigate (FFG) program. Major
19
elements and trends of this new policy include:
1. In-house ship design aided by some private contractor




2. Rigorous, systematic approach with required review
and approval to proceed through the major acquisition
stages (from CF/CD)
;
3. No Total Package approach in that the design and
production phases are rigidly separate (from "conven-
tional") ;
4. Formal documentation (from CF/CD) ;
5. Improvement of the quality and validity of cost esti-
mates ;
6. Flexibility in contract type and liberalization of
escalation and inflation clause usage;
7. Tailoring of acquisition approach to the needs of
each project;
8. Emphasis on constrained design through the "Design
to Cost" approach; and
9. Emphasis on proven design and equipment through a
"fly-before-buy" approach.
The last of these policy elements are the most unique of
the present approach. The "Design to Cost" method was new to
the Navy, but fairly commonplace in private industry new-pro-
duct development. The method is planned for use in non-nuclear
ship acquisition. It involves a period of identification and
study of alternative designs which are technically feasible for
satisfying the need requirement and estimation for their gross
characteristics using ship synthesis and engineering analysis
techniques. After this, design constraints are established
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within the Navy. In the FFG project, these initial design
constraints concerned the acquisition cost, full-load displace-
ment, and crew size. Performance capabilities above the minimum
specified were then traded-off to stay within the design con-
straints. Thereafter discrete cost elements were converted to
"design to" requirements. Design baseline cost goals were
rigidly reviewed throughout the design phases.
The key element which has grown from recognition of the
need for increased test and evaluation during the acquisition
process has been prototyping or " fly-before-buy " . Total proto-
typing of major naval vessels is still not feasible, however,
due to the time and expense involved; consequently, a modified
approach has been used. This involves early construction of
land based test sites to evaluate entire systems such as the
propulsion and combat systems, and allowance of adequate time
between the various design and production phases co permit
realization of the design test and evaluation prerequisites.
The best example of this process is the FFG program. In this
program, two cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts were awarded
for private shipbuilders to aid the Navy in ship system design.
One shipyard, Bath Iron Works, was then selected to build the
"lead" ship (the first ship to be built) .. Separate lead-ship
construction was begun well in advance of follow-ship con-
struction in order to validate the design of the lead ship.
After construction had been underway for some time, follow-ship
shipbuilders were selected on a competitive basis with fixed-
price incentive (FPI) multi-year contractors to be awarded to a
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predetermined number of builders. These follow-shipbuilding
yards are Bath Iron Works, Todd-Seattle , and Todd-San Pedro.
4 . Current Acquisition Methodology
Exhibit 2 depicts the current Navy ship acquisition pro-
cess. It reflects the application of the requirements contained
in DODINST 5000.1 as they apply to the procurement of ships.
The concept of the different phases of the process (i.e., Con-
cept Formulation, Demonstration, etc.) each being terminated
with definite milestones (decision review points) has continued
from the SECDEF McNamara era. Decisions concerning program pro-
gress, suitability, continuance, and modification are recommended
or made variously by the CNO Executive Board (CEB) , the Navy
Systems Acquisition Review Council (NSARC) , the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) , and the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) . The principal document used in these reviews
is the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) . Milestone is an
additional decision point added since the days of SECDEF McNamara.
Through the Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) document, this
decision point formalized the requirement to review an operational
need associated with a Defense Department mission, and the
technical feasibility (or risk) of the program coming to fruition.
This revised process emphasizes the following:
a. The need for a strong technology base to support program
development.
b. The initiation of only those programs which meet a
need stated in operational terms, and which have been
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c. The consideration of logistics support, cost, and
schedule as principal design parameters, when system
trade-offs are necessary.
d. The use of experimental models and prototypes to the
maximum extent possible to reduce technical uncertainty.
e. The commencement of test and evaluation efforts as
early as possible, and the evaluation of these results
by the DSARC prior to the commitment to large scale
production.
While all these aspects affected the claims during the period
under consideration, the last two were undoubtedly the most
vexatious, particularly with regard to ship procurement. The
failure (or inability) to fully test and proof a prototype ship
prior to production coupled with the failure to evaluate a pro-
duction model prior to full scale production have been a major
influence on the proliferation of costly and claims-producing
changes to ships during construction. Another major source of
these changes has been the late delivery of government furnished
information (GFI) which occurred primarily when more than one
constractor was involved with the construction of the same ship
type or when different contractors were awarded the design and
construction contracts. Due to its importance as a cause of
claims, a more detailed discussion of changes is provided in
Appendix A. Earlier involvement of the contractor in the
initial design process, a lead ship evaluation period prior to
full scale production, and the follow ship contractor review of
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the lead ship detailed design plans are key elements of the
current ship acquisition process. (See Exhibit 2) . These
elements aimed at correcting some of the major causes of the
claims which occurred during 19 74 - 197 3. The use of a land
based test sight was a prototype for evaluating combat systems
in the FFG program. It also has been a beneficial and innovative
measure instituted with this same goal in mind.
This improved ship acquisition methodology, as demonstrated
by the FFG program to date, continues to look promising by com-
parison with previous methods.
B. PRIVATE SECTOR: U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Prior to the late 19 50 's the U.S. private shipbuilding in-
dustry was predominately characterized by many small, privately
owned firms. The public policy of allocating shipbuilding
contracts to shipyards, coupled with the simpler technology
required for construction, allowed this extensive fragmentation
to exist. Beginning in the late 1950 's, many of these smaller
shipbuilding firms were taken over or acquired by major corpo-
rations or conglomerates. The effect that this change in the
basic structure of the shipbuilding industry had on the genera-
tion and processing of shipbuilding claims is the subject matter
of this section.
1. Definitions
The concepts of conglomeration and corporate expansion
are themselves the subject of a diversity of opinion in the




a. Corporate expansion encompasses growth either by (a)
hosizontal consolidation to increase a firm's product line by
increasing the line of good sold to its customers, or by (b)
vertical consolidation which builds a firm's capabilities along
its manufacturing chain either forward towards its markets (cus-
tomers) or backwards towards its sources of supply.
b. Conglomeration is defined in its more confining sense
as either the merger of two firms or the acquisition of one firm
by another with the proviso the two original firms, before the
union, had neither a buyer-seller relationship nor a functional
relationship in manufacturing or distribution.
When defined in this way, both conglomeration and corporate
expansion tend to have similar effects on the shipbuilding claims
problem, in that both have added resources at their command, have
some larger management structure, have the potential to wield
more outside influence (or power) to accomplish corporate goals,
exhibit a more complex and often more flexible financial struc-
ture, are responsible to a larger constituency, generally deve-
lop more sophisticated management information and planning sys-
tems, and finally impose greater management accountability within
the corporate structures.
2 . Effects of Conglomeration
Exhibit 3 shows the most significant changes due to cor-
porate influences, the author's classification of these changes,
and the date these formerly independent shipyards began to
























































* Classifications in accordance with the definition
of corporation and conglomerate adopted previously.
** NASSCO is in dual ownership of Kaiser Industries
(50%) and Morrison-Knudson Inc. (50%) but management




conglomerate parents. Exhibit 4 is the Fortune 500 ranking of
the parent corporations in 1976, the midpoint of the period of
interest to this study. From this exhibit it is apparent that
the shipbuilding industry has changed from one of several small
fractionalized, firms to one dominated by large, powerful
corporations
.
Five major areas of conglomerate influence on the U.S. ship-
building industry are apparent: facility expansion and moder-
nization programs, organizational structure, management philosophy
and expertise, Navy shipbuilding claims, and power and influence.
These are hereafter discussed in turn.
The presence of large corporations in the shipbuilding in-
dustry has afforded a greater capability for the smaller number
of larger shipyards to keep pace with technology. Conglomeration
has brought greater flexibility into shipbuilding facility
investment programs through their larger financial base and
through their widely diversified nature. The conglomerate-con-
trolled shipyards have been better able to undertake large
facility expansion and modernization programs, and to maintain
such programs in the face of adverse economic conditions.
Additionally, these conglomerates have shown flexibility in their
market strategy by gaining large shares of the naval shipbuilding
market.
The acquired shipyards have undergone a characteristic
change in their organizational structure from that of an inde-
pendent business entity to that of a division of a corporation.


























* 1976 rankings from Fortune, May 1976
N/L - Not Listed
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however, it is more significant for the conglomerate acquisitions
because, generally, the acquired firm becomes a lower-level seg-
ment. This manifests itself in several ways. Additional levels
are placed in the decision making process which tends to encum-
ber and delay shipyard executive decision making and, in effect,
take shipbuilding out of the hands of the shipbuilder. Absentee
corporate top management may be less aware of, and less sensitive
to, local circumstances and customer relations. Further, the
conglomerate hierarchy has introduced a trend towards a higher
level management relationship in naval shipbuilding as evidenced
by relationships which had generally existed at the shipbuilder-
Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding level but have tended to rise to
the conglomerate management-Navy/Department of Defense level.
Other changes have occurred in the management philosophy and
expertise of conglomerate-acquired shipyards. In some cases
shipyard technical management has been replaced by management-
oriented executives from the conglomerate parent. Some have
brought new and sophisticated management techniques. Management
philosophies have shifted towards a greater emphasis on financial
status and profit orientation. These changes in overall ship-
yard management attitudes, philosophies and orientation have
adversely impacted upon the shipyards' relationships with their
customers, particularly the Navy.
"Since their arrival on the shipbuilding scene, the conglom-
erates have been involved in the issue of shipbuilding claims,
primarily due to the escalation of this claims problem during a
period in which conglomerate-controlled shipyards have become
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increasingly dominant in the shipbuilding industry- The con-
glomerate-controlled shipbuilders have accounted for the large
majority of the claims submitted. While it cannot be positively
confirmed that conglomerates were a primary motivating force
for the recent claims problem; it can be stated that they were
a contributing and aggravating influence. As will be shown later
in this chapter, the conglomerate-controlled shipyards have
demonstrated a greater propensity to exercise claims due to a
greater resource base of both manpower and financing, and their
high financial priorities. Thus, the conglomerates are more
ready, willing, and able to prosecute claims.
The conglomerates have gained power and influence within the
shipbuilding industry because of their number, market shares,
and shipbuilding capabilities . They potentially have the power
to affect many aspects important to the industry including Navy
procurement policies and decisions, claims settlements, internal
Department of Defense relations, and other political and business
matters. Their leverage may predominantly reflect their own
self-interests, but it also appears to have increased the influence
of the industry as a whole.
C. CONTRACTS: THE AGREEMENTS 20
A contract is defined as a promise for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or for the performance of which the law
recognizes a duty. More simply, a contract is a legal agreement
for each of two parties to give something of value, called
"consideration". Obviously, prior to entering into this

agreement both parties must assess the risks involved. Since
shipbuilding is the longest, most complex process in the spectrum
of government acquisitions, the proper assessment of risks is of
central importance in minimizing the claims which occur from
such contracts. This section addresses these risks and their
allocation through a contract and its clauses.
1 . Risks
The broad categories of risk in shipbuilding are associated
with the technical aspects, the cost, and schedule provisions of
a contract. Technical risk involves the degree to which the
design and construction process extends the current state of the
art. It is highly dependent on the timing, accuracy, and under-
standing of the technical documentation provided (normally GFI),
and the number of changes necessary to this documentation during
the construction process. (Appendix A is germane.) Cost risk
concerns the ability of the parties to forward price and thus
accurately predict the construction costs. It is affected by
labor costs, material costs (and thus inflation) , the method of
payment of these costs, and the extent of the warranty, both with
respect to time and degree of responsibility. Schedule risks
involve the construction and delivery timing of the end product (s)
.
It is dependent upon capacity of the construction activity and
the availability and management of the firm's factors of pro-
duction: labor, materials, and information. It is emphasized
that these factors are not orthogonal in nature. Rather, they
are highly interdependent, in addition to being inherently and
unavoidably speculative. The identification and proper allocation
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of these risks through selection of the appropriate contract
type is a requirement of the DOD system acquisition directives.
The reduction of this requirement to writing neither reflects
the difficulties associated therewith nor ameliorates the process
of risk identification. The very existence of any claims at all
attests to this fact.
Once risks are assessed to the maximum degree possible, the
shipbuilder and the contractor, through contract negotiations,
must apportion these risks. For apportionment purposes, risks
are considered in three categories: those within the Navy's
control, those within the contractor's control, and those beyond
the control of either party. The government usually structures
contracts to assume the risks within its control. The Changes
clause prescribed by the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
(formerly ASPR) is a prime example of this, wherein the contractor
is entitled to an equitable adjustment for Navy-ordered changes.
With respect to contractor-controlled risks
,
general practice
has been to form the contract such that the contractor bears
this risk (i.e., contractor furnished information and equipment,
labor hours, overhead costs, etc.) . The single exception to this
policy involves the few instances where a cost- type contract
has been used because the overall uncertainty was judged to be
too great for the contractor to bear alone. (Footnote 6 pertains.)
The major vehicle for contractor risk assumption has been the
fixed-price incentive (FPI) contract in which the contractor
commits to a fixed-ceiling price and experiences profit reductions
above the target costs, at a mutually agreed-upon rate. The FPI
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contract was the principal type used for the contracts under
consideration in this paper. Finally, for risks beyond the con-
trol of either party (i.e., social and environmental legislation,
inflation, natural disasters, etc.) , Navy practice has been to
allocate such risks to the contractor. The most notable excep-
tion to this policy, also an issue in the settlements covered
in this paper, has been risks associated with labor and material
price increases. These have been handled through economic price
adjustments (EPA) . It is germane that if a FPI contract type is
used, contract clauses must be employed which specifically
address each risk area in the context of distributing this risk
equitably among the parties
.
2 . Clauses
Contract clauses attempt to assign and define both the
rights and responsibilities of each party in advance, rather than
leaving these matters to negotiation or adjudication after the
contract is formed. Some clauses are required by the DAR and
thus are difficult to alter. Other optional clauses contained
in the DAR are used only when both parties so agree. The parties
may also agree to include clauses not contained in the DAR, but
which are not contrary to the law. Discussed hereafter are
only the principal clauses which caused claims difficulties.
a. Escalation
This clause is intended to account for the effects
of inflation as it applies to labor and material costs. Escalation
is measured by a labor index for shipyards published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) , and a material index drawn
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the Wholesale Price Indices, also published by the BLS . Under
the old clause (prior to 1975) , escalation was paid on the basis
of (1) pre-established rates (at the forming of the contract)
and fixed phasing, and (2) allowable costs not exceeding the
initial target cost of the contract. This escalation coverage
ceased on a date related to the contractually scheduled delivery
date of the vessel. Further, escalation and progress payments
were limited to 105% of the costs incurred to avoid excessive
payments. This methodology worked reasonably well and was
accepted by contractors through the 1960's. The following decade
has seen unanticipated double digit inflation. Additionally,
other environmental influences played havoc with this system.
In 1975, this clause was changed in the following manner to
treat contractors more equitably:
(1) Escalation is paid on the basis of actual expendi-
ture phasing, as incurred.
(2) Escalation is paid on allowable costs incurred, not
to exceed ceiling price.
(3) Escalation coverage continues to the actual delivery
date.
(4) For periods beyond the contract delivery date,
escalation is paid on the basis of the lesser BLS
index for either the contract delivery date or the
current value.
This new method has proven satisfactory, but its late institution




Prior to 19 73, these payments were based on the
physical progress of ships construction, and were limited to 105%
of the incurred costs with a retention of 5% of the price of the
ship. In 1973, SECNAV changed this policy, but after considerable
complaints from contractors concerning working capital problems
this newer policy was recinded, without having been used in a
contract, in favor of the above policy in effect prior to 19 73.
In 1975, the current policy was established. It specifies that
10% of the contract price be withheld until the 50% physical
completion point, limits payments to 100% of the allowable costs
up to the 50% completion point, and to 10 5% thereafter, and pro-
vides for biweekly payments
.
c. Total System Responsibility
This clause was associated with TPP and was used in
the LHA/DD 96 3 contracts with Litton/Ingalls. It is no longer
used, but was the basis of substantial claims. Under this clause,
the contractor assumed virtually full responsibility for designing
and delivering ships which met particular performance require-
ments/capabilities. These responsibilities encompassed those
for integrated logistic support, including maintenance and supply
support. Commens urate ly, it was the Navy's explicit responsi-
bility to minimize its involvement in the design and construction
21process. Exhibit 5 shows a more complete representation of
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This clause, in addition to providing the contracting
officer with authority to make unilateral changes, also required
contractors to give notice of new or impending constructive
changes as they occur. The shipbuilder was given 10 days to
,veport the constructive change, the contracting officer was re-
quired to respond within 10 days thereafter, and the contractor
had 45 days from the contracting officer's response to assert
any claim associated therewith. See Appendix A for a further
discussion of changes.
e. Problem Identification Reports
This clause required the contract to report any con-
tract performance problem exclusive of changes which would be
likely to result in either a delay in delivery or a significant
claim. It also contained a provision that precluded equitable
adjustments for such "problems" from containing costs incurred
more than 20 days prior to notice of the problem.
f. Equitable Adjustments: Waiver and Release of Claims
The requirements of this clause stipulated that
equitable adjustment submissions contain all the cost elements
of a change order, including delay and disruption costs.
g. Government Furnished Equipment
Contractors frequently attributed substantial delay
and distruption problems to late delivery of GFE . All GFE
clauses emphasize the need of both parties to minimize delays
resulting from GFE. Problems' arise over the requirement that
all delivery dates for GFE be extended by a time equal to any
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extensions in the ships delivery date. Further, some GFE
clauses limit the government's liability for late GFE to any
slippage of the vessel delivery date in excess of 130 days,
h. Drawings and Other Data
Because of the size and complexity of the data en-
compassed by these clauses, claim-causing deficiencies or dis-
crepancies are normally found to exist. The Navy usually assumes
responsibility for contract drawing and contract guidance drawing
deficiencies, thus entitling the contractor to an equitable ad-
justment. The far more detailed working drawings, prepared
after the contract award, are another matter. In nuclear ships
some working drawings are non-deviation drawings - meaning they
must be followed to the letter unless a waiver is granted by
the Navy. Other working drawings in nuclear construction, and
all working drawings in conventional ship construction are
furnished on an "as is" basis. The Navy appears to assume
responsibility for non-deviation drawings, but has argues that
it has no liability for working drawings furnished on an "as is"
basis
.
Constructive changes, a legally recognized concept, have
long been identified as a principal cause of claims. Since
DAR does not recognize this concept, it provides no tools to
treat constructive changes. Thus the Navy developed a number of
contract clauses to deal with circumstances which caused construc-
tive changes through early identification and procedurally
processing of the root causes. Today industry frequently refers
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to this group as "anti-claims" clauses. The clauses addressed
in subparagraphs c through h above belong to the "anti-claims"
clause group.
D. CLAIMS: THE DISAGREEMENTS
23
Once a contractual agreement is reached, the basis is
established for potential disagreement between the parties. The
right to this disagreement is well recognized in law. If one
of the parties violates or breaks one of the legal covenants
of the agreement, this constitutes a breach of contract. A
claim is not a breach of contract. Conceptually, it is rather
a disagreement over the meaning and impact of the original
agreement with respect to each of the parties providing equitable
consideration. Claims for shipbuilding are not new. They have
been a part of the naval ship acquisition process since the early
days of sail. Just as the nature of the acquisition process,
the environment of the shipbuilders , and the contracts themselves
have changed, so has the nature of the disagreements. During the
period extending into the late 1960 's it was common practice
for shipbuilders to file their claims not only after the ship
was delivered, but on occasion up to 2 years after the warranty
period had expired. The process for claims settlement was
similarly at a more leisurely pace, as exemplified in Chapter I
by one settlement occuring 14 years after the ship was delivered.
The magnitude of the current claims., the working capital
pressures on contractors, and the unprecedented effects of
inflation have contributed significantly to this forced
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abandonment of the more leisurely pace in this process. This
section addresses the nature of claims particularly with respect
to their magnitude.
1 . Definition
Section 1-401.55 of the Navy Procurement Directives (NPD)
essentially defines the term "claim" as a request for contract
adjustment, involving to a significant extent, "constructive
change" i.e., a change based on government conduct, including
actions or inactions which is not a formal written change order,
but has the effect of requiring the contractor to perform work
different from, or in addition to, that prescribed by the terms
of the contract.
In 19 77, Congress established the requirement for the DOD
to report the validity of claims over $5 million before payments
could be made. In interpreting this requirement, the Chief of
24Naval Material used the following definition:
The term "Claim" as defined for this purpose is far
broader than the definition contained in NPD 1-401.55 (b)
and thus applies to a wide range of contractual actions
including for instance requests for equitable adjustment,
submitted by contractors as a result.
The term "Request for Equitable Adjustment" (REA) has been
used in recent years to define demands for increases in contracr
prices based on events which allegedly fall within the provisions
of the contract, including written change orders, escalation,
and late or defective GFE or GFI. Even though REA ' s are the
result of formal changes, the Navy evaluates them under the same
procedures as constructive changes. This is done becuase of the
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large dollar amounts and the complex nature of these requests.
Although the difference in the terms "claim" and "REA" have
some significance to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) , they are not normally differentiated in accepted Navy
usage, and will thus not be herein.
For purposes of this thesis then, the term "claim" shall
mean a contractor's demand for increased compensation because of
an alleged constructive change, an expressed contract clause, or
both.
2 . Magnitude
Exhibit 6 shows the magnitude of outstanding shipbuilding
claims at the end of calendar years 19 71 through 19 78. The 1971
claim amount is representative of the claim amounts experienced
EXHIBIT 6
OUTSTANDING MAJOR SHIPBUILDING CLAIMS*









NOTES: *Cumulative net value at the end of each calendar
year.
**As of July 19 78. This amount includes the GD/EB
and Litton/Ingalls settlements, but not the NNSDC
settlement.











over the prior decade. In October 1978, the Navy had a major
claim settlement of the NNSDC claim of $742 million which reduces
the adjusted year end amount for 19 78 to $16 3.6 million, exclusive
of any claims which may have been filed in the latter half of
that year. In any event, it is clear that the magnitude of
shipbuilding claims at the end of 19 78 was at or below the
amounts being experienced in the 1960s.
Exhibit 7 shows settled and outstanding claims by year of
contract award. This method of depiction permits linking the
amount of claims with the acquisition policy being employed
at a given time. The contract which generated the largest
single claim was the LHA total package procurement awarded to
Litton/Ingalls in 1969. Earlier contracts in the 1960 's awarded
through competitive bid procedures (normally with firm- fixed-
price contracts), also generated substantial claims. This
exhibit also supports NAVSEASYSCOM 1 s observation that shipbuilding
claims tend to surface about four years after contract award.
This delay is caused in part because of the length of time in-
volved in the construction process. Therefore, it is still too
early to make judgements concerning the success of the lead ship/
follow ship concept discussed earlier in this chapter.
E. SETTLEMENTS: THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ADJUDICATION25
The methodology for proceeding with a shipbuilding claim
against the government is specified in the Disputes clause of
the contract. (Appendix B is a representative standard Disputes
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the contractor files the written basis and elements of the
claim with the appropriate contracting officer, normally located
at the cognizant Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair (SUPSHIPS) activity. The contracting officer, after a
decision and review process, accepts or rejects this claim. If
the claim is rejected at this point, a final contracting
officer's decision will be issued. If the claim is accepted, a
detailed evaluative process ensues, which may result in an
agreed settlement or again a final contracting officer's decision.
The contractor may appeal this decision to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . This body, after its delib-
erations, renders a decision which is binding on the government.
However, if the contractor considers this decision inequitable,
he may appeal it to the U.S. Court of Claims. The decision of
this body becomes binding on both parties, excepting of course,
the contractor's right to appeal this decision to the Supreme
Court. These procedures exist within the contract, thus con-
struction is continuing during these procedures. It is emphasized
that, in general, these procedures are not addressing a breach
of contract. Such a breach would be pursued in the U.S. Federal
Court system (including the Court of Claims) and could involve
contractual work stoppage or termination. This procedure
involves a contractual default by one of the parties , and is not
the central issue of this paper.
In addition to the above procedures, the contractor has
another avenue for pursuing his claim or perceived contractual
inquity. This is through the use of Public Law 85-80 4, a method
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which encompasses government procurements only, and thus has
no equivalent in contractual matters involving private parties
or firms only. This section explores all the above procedures
in more detail.
1. Procedures Within the Contract
v
Upon receipt of a shipbuilding claim, the cognizant
Navy contracting officer performs a preliminary review to deter-
mine its completeness and acceptability. He is guided in this
pursuit by the following directives: the NPD , the DAR, and
the DAR Manual for Contract Pricing. On acceptance of the
claim, its dollar value is considered. If the claimed amount
is less than $1 million, the claim is normally adjudicated by
the appropriate SUPSHIPS organization, and is not of primary
interest to this thesis. The procedures for claims exceeding
$1 million are described below.
a. Claims Settlement Team
Once the claim is accepted, a claim settlement team
is established, consisting of a contracting officer (team manager)
,
engineer, counsel and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
auditor. The number of personnel assigned to each of these
functional areas varies widely and is dependent on the complexity
and extent of the claim. For example, the Navy claims settle-
ment team for the Litton/Ingalls claims was comprised of over
200 personnel during some stages of the team's efforts. The
claims settlement team reviews the claim and prepares a claim
review plan which consists of:
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(1) A brief summary of each claim item and an item
classification (i.e., delay, disruption, defective
specifications, etc.).
(2) The elements of proof required to support entitle-
ment for each claim element.
(3) An opinion as to the data necessary to support the
legal entitlement and amount, and the extent to which
the contractor has provided this data.
(4) A processing schedule containing the estimated
completion date for each major event.
(5) An outline of the proposed data filing system to
be employed during claim analysis, evaluation and
litigation.
The claim team then investigates the claim to develope the
relevant facts, and has the right to request, receive, and
inspect all relevant data/records of the contractor. From
this factual data, the team develops preliminary documentation
of the Navy's position consisting of:
(1) A preliminary technical analysis report (TAR) pre-
pared by the team engineer and/or technical analysts
.
It contains a factual delineation of the claim and the
engineering evaluation/analysis of the claim's technical
merits
.
(2) A preliminary legal memorandum prepared by the
team counsel, and based on the preliminary TAR. This
memorandum points up to areas needing further clarifi-




(3) Audit assistance to evaluate the facts and verify
the costs.
This preliminary documentation receives a headquarters review
by NAVSEA and the Navy Office of Counsel, which provide their
comments to the team manager for preparing the final TAR.
Final claim team documentation consists of the final TAR,
final legal memorandum and a DCAA audit report. These documents
consider all the team member comments plus those from the head-
quarters review. The final legal memorandum contains
analyses concerning the applicability and adequacy of the con-
tractor's legal theories of government liability. Further, it
evaluates the adequacy of evidence to satisfy the elements of
proof the contractor would need to support his legal theories.
Finally, it assigns litigative risks to the appropriate elements
of the claim based on the relevant laws/legal procedures,
b. Litigative Risk
This term is used generally to represent a legal
assessment of areas where Navy counsel considers weaknesses
exist in the Navy's position on a claim element. Should the
claim be appealed to the ASBCA or the Court of Claims, these
weaknesses could result in additional compensation to the con-
tractor above that established by the final TAR/audit positions.
Litigative risk is expressed as a dollar amount and includes
two facets: actual litigative risk, where the Navy questions
the contractors right or entitlement to compensation, and a




In questions of legal entitlement, litigative risk is com-
puted by taking a percentage of the disputed item. For example,
where it is considered that no legal facts/precedence exists
which would permit the contractor to prevail, zero % litigative
risk would be assigned. Conversely, if Navy counsel is certain
the contractor will prevail, 100% litigative risk would be
assigned
.
Questions of quantum are frequently resolved by the ASBCA
or the Court of Claims using a jury verdict technique. They
resort to this technique when they are not convinced that either
the Navy's or the contractor's position is totally correct and
that the facts in the record do not permit an exact calculation
of the increased costs. In assessing quantum, the Navy counsel
attempts to estimate the outcome of this jury verdict situation
and includes this assessment in the litigative risk.
Litigative risk amounts are not automatically allowed to
a contractor, but are used in establishing a pre-negotiating
ceiling. It thus provides a negotiating window by justifying
amounts in excess of the Navy TAR/audit positions.
The Advisory Audit Report provides the DCAA auditors
'
review and analyses of the cost of the claim, and the review of
the contractor's accounting system, estimating methods, and
other related fiscal data.
c. Further Procedures
Based on the three above delineated documents (the
legal memorandum, the TAR, and the audit report) , a
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pre-negotiation range is established and presented for review
through NAVSEA, to NAVMAT for approval. This approval is called
the Pre-Negotiation Business Clearance and prescribes all the
details of the proposed negotiation. The negotiations are then
conducted. Following these negotiations, a Post-Negotiation
Business Clearance is required in accordance with the following
criteria
:
(1) Claims having a proposed settlement value of be-
tween $1 million and $20 million are reviewed by NAV-
SEA 's Contract Administration Division and Claims Board.
Additionally, proposed settlements in excess of $5
million are summarized and informally reveiwed by
CHNAVMAT and ASN (M,RA&L) , with final approval being
granted by NAVSEA' s Deputy Commander for Contracts.
(2) Claims having a proposed settlement amount in
excess of $20 million are processed by the following
chain
:
(a) Review and recommendation by NAVSEA ' s Claims
Settlement Board;
(b) Review and recommendation by NAVSEA ' s Deputy
Commander for Contracts;
(c) Review and recommendation by NAVMAT ' s Claims
Board;
(d) Review and final approval by ASN (M,RA&L)
.
Final disposition of the claim is made by issuing an approved
contract modification for a negotiated settlement, or a con-
tracting officer's final decision, if agreement is not reached.
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Contractors can appeal either their claims or contracting
officer's decisions to the ASBCA for entitlement and/or quantum
determinations. Settlement negotiations can and often do con-
tinue while claims are under such appeals. As well, payments
can and do proceed based on the contracting officer's (govern-
ment's) final position, while such are under appeal.
2 . Armed Services Board Contract of Appeals
As delineated in the DAR, this Board is consituted at
the direction of, and as the direct representative of both
SECDEF and the Secretaries of the component military ser/ices.
Its sole purpose is to hear appeals from contractors concerning
contracting officers final decisions and/or disputes. For
shipbuilding claims, these appeals are taken pursuant to con-
tracts requiring decisions from either SECDEF or SECNAV, or in
accordance with any departmental directive, exclusive of a
contract, but in which SECDEF grants the right of appeal.
a. Composition
The entire board is comprised of qualified attorneys.
It has a Board Chairman and two Vice Chairmen appointed by
SECDEF. In turn, the Board Chairman establishes divisions to
handle the appeals, and appoints a head of each division. The
Board Chairman, Vice Chairmen, and division heads comprise the
senior decising group of the board.
b. Limits of Authority
This board is generally limited to decisions in fact,
but not in law. However, if an appeal is made pursuant to the
contract's contractual Disputes clause, which limits appeals to
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questions of fact, the Board, at its discretion, may hear, con-
sider, and decide questions of law to complete its adjudication.
Just how binding these finds on matters of law are on the the
contractor is open to legal interpretation and question, based
on the nature of the findings. Clearly, reformation of the
contract is beyond the jurisdiction of the ASBCA, since such
legal authority does not exist within DOD . Thus, matters involving
a breach of contract can be decided no lower than the Court of
Claims. Therefore, the ASBCA usually limits its decisions to
claims for which relief is available under specific contract
provisions. Notwithstanding this usual modus operandi, the
ASBCA sometimes hears cases and issues findings concerning
matters which do not arise under specific contract clauses. Fre-
quently these findings can be useful in promoting a settlement,
even though the finding is not considered final in a purely
legal sense.
c. Procedures
To start this procedure, the contract first addresses
his written appeal to the appropriate service Secretary, and
files it with the contracting officer from whose decision the
appeal is taken. In turn, the contracting officer endorses the
appeal, forwards it to the ASBCA, and, within 3 days, forwards
his pertinent documents consisting of: a statement of the claim
(or dispute) with references to the contract provisions, and a
statement of relevant facts including the areas of agreement,
disagreement, and the basis for the contracting officer's decision.
On receipt of the claim, the ASBCA advises both the contractor
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and the contracting officer of the Board's rules. The Board
then hears motions, and upon ruling favorably on the issue of
jurisdiction, dockets the case. Within 30 days after docketing
the contractor must provide a statement of each claim, the
basis, and the dollar amount claimed. Thirty days thereafter
the contracting officer is to file the answer to these specific
claims with the Board. If these timeframes are not met, the
Board can enter a general denial for the government. If a case
on the docket does not proceed on time for reasons beyond the
Board's control, it is placed in a suspense status. If this
suspension continues for an inordinately long time, the Board
may dismiss the case without prejudice, which means no finding
or prejudice is rendered or implied.
Any Board member designated by the Chairman is authorized
to hold hearings, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and
argument; and report the evidence/argument to the designated
division for consideration and determination. Thereafter, the
division may render a decision or the division chairman may
refer the case to the senior deciding group for determination.
In these matters, the Board decides its own rules, regulations,
methods and procedures. This procedure of hearing by only one
member, and subsequent review and re-review process has been
criticized in some quarters on the basis of its unfairness on
the one hand, and its lengthiness on the other. In any event,
the proceedings here, just as in- the Court of Claims, are
adverserial in nature, and thus follow litigative procedures.
Thus , the preparation for and processing of a claim through
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either the ASBCA or the Court of Claims is protracted and
complex, involving, for large cases, literally thousands of
individual claim elements, all covering very complex issues.
For example, it was estimated by Navy counsel that litigation
before the ASBCA in the Litton/Ingalls ' LHA case would take
from 6 to 10 years. Further, even after this process, the
possibilities had to be admitted that either an adverse finding
(in whole or in part) , or inadequate legal authority to process
the claim with DOD, or an appeal by the contractor could force
a significant part of this entire process to be repeated before
the Court of Claims. Obviously, the entire settlement process
described heretofore is both time consuming and expensive to
both the contractor and the government. Therefore the pursuit
of other legal remedies is understandable.
3. Public Law 85-804
Under a specific set of circumstances, another legal
remedy does exist for claims against the government arising from
defense procurement contracts . This remedy involves the use of
Public Law 85-804. The legal tenets of this law, in some form,
have been in use since World War II. Since then these principles
have been used quite frequently to settle claims. In recent
years however, this law has been used on occasion to settle
extremely large claims. These occasions have been surrounded
by heated controversy at the highest levels of our government
and have received wide coverage in the media. In these con-
troversies, opponents of this law frequently use terms such as
military complex-defense industry collusion, contractor bailout,
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abbrogation of governmental contractual rights, and waste of
public funds; while the proponents employ such phrases as
national defense, vitality of the industrial base, and equitable
adjustment. The most recent of such incidences involed a part
of the shipbuilding claims settlements under consideration in
this thesis. Thus this section address this law as a means of
settling shipbuilding claims,
a. Background
Since the beginning of World War II, the Congress
has been studying the needs of procurement agencies in order to
devise comprehensive and effective standards and guidance for
procuring goods and services. With the advent of that war, it
was discovered that contracting agencies did not possess
sufficient authority to purchase war materials promptly and
efficiently. Navy procurement at the beginning of the war was
regulated by a huge mass of undigested and uncoordiated legis-
lation. Some of these statutes had accumulated on the books over
a period of more than 10 years. Obviously, many were out-dated,
many were conflicting,, and some had apparently been enacted to
service special, but long since forgotten purposes.
To overcome these deficiencies and permit large-scale war-
time procurement, Congress passed Title II of the First War
Powers Act of 1941, the predecessor of Public Law 85-804. Prior
to enactment, debate on this bill revealed congressional concern
that granting contracting agencies the power to amend contracts
without regard for other legal provisions meant granting them
unlimited power in procurement matters. Thus Congress restricted
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use of this law to those instances in which it would
"facilitate the prosecution of the war" ,
After the war, Congress again addressed the need for com-
prehensive, coordinated procurement authority by enacting two
procurement statutes. Certain Title II powers (such as
negotiation authority) which were once thought to be extra-
ordinary, particularly in peacetime, were incorporated into
these statutes; thus reflecting a basic change in congressional
attitude towards government procurement. Even though the
scope of authority in these statutes was narrowed, procurement
agencies still found these powers necessary in defense contracting
,
Through President Truman's efforts, the Title II provisions
were reactivated in 19 51, at the outset of the Korean Conflict.
The continuing commitment for the procurement process to remain
abreast of national defense goals during the cold war period
following the Korean Conflict spurred Congress to extend this
"reactivation" of Title II powers five more times.
In 19 58, during extensive congressional hearings, several
government agencies testified on the continued necessity for
this expanded authority, and the Comptroller General confirmed
that no abuses of these powers had been discovered. The thrust
of these hearings was two fold: to verify the need for these
powers, and to ascertain whether this need was permanent in
nature. These needs were justified, and Congress passed Public
Law 85-804. However, for reasons which are unclear from the
record, a provision was inserted limiting the law's use to




Until recently, this national emergency state had been
continuously extended. It has become clear, after almost four
decades of continuous use of these expanded powers, that the
vitality and legal precedence for the use of this law now tran-
cends any "national emergency". Rather, recent use has em-
phasized the "facilitation of national defense" phrase of the
statute
.
In the early 1970s, the first large claim resulting from
the TPP acquisition policy surfaced in the aircraft industy.
This earlier surfacing of this problem in the aircraft industry
is understandable considering the shorter procurement cycle for
aircraft relative to naval vessels. The most prominent of these
claims were submitted by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation concerning
the C-5A aircraft procurement. This claim was settled under
P.L. 85-804 and caused substantial congressional interest and
concern. From this concern flowed the most recent change to
P.L. 85-804, incorporated into P.L. 93-155, the DOD Appropriation
Act of 19 74. By this change, authority to obligate in excess of
$25 million for a P.L. 85-804 settlement required congressional
approval. This approval is tacit in that Congress must be in-
formed in writing of such proposed usage, and if Congress does
not specifically disapprove this proposal within a continuous
period of 60 days while in session, thereafter, the funds may
be so employed.
b. Provisions
One of the broadest grants of authority to the
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President is contained in P.L. 85-804. It empowers the
President to authorize government agencies that exercise func-
tions concerned with national defense to enter into contracts
or amendments to contracts, without regard to the other pro-
visions of law relating to contracts, whenever he deems such
action would facilitate the national defense. By Executive
Order the President has given all major procurement agencies
authority to grant relief under this act. Currently the DOD
and ten other agencies are granted this authority.
(1) Philosphy and Intent
This statute was enacted for the benefit of
the government — not for the purpose of aiding contractors
.
Consequently, contractors have not legal or equitable rights
under this Act. Any contractor's application for contractual
adjustment under this Act is, in essence, a request for relief
as a matter of "grace"; and the final decision under this Act
is not reviewable, either by the ASBCA, or the Comptroller
General, or the GAO or by the courts.
Every contractual adjustment under this statute must have
as its basis the finding that the adjustment will, in fact,
"facilitate the national defense". The principal purpose for
authorizing these extraordinary contractual adjustments is to
prevent delay in the government's procurement programs through
assurance to contractors that they need not cease performance
and resort to litigation in order to protect their interests,
or to obtain fair and equitable treatment from the government.
The legistlative history of this statute makes it clear that an
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individual contract adjustment need not necessarily benefit
the government in order for it to be an adjustment which
facilitates the national defense. Stated in other terms, relief
may be granted even though in a specific instance, such action
does not result in a benefit directly traceable to the govern-
ment.
(2) Conditions for Relief
Four types of contractual adjustment are
specified in the statute. The first two are labeled as "amend-
ments without consideration" , although each is granted on a
significantly different basis. The remaining two are "correc-
tion of mistakes" and "formalization of informal commitments".
Each of these conditions will be addressed in turn.
When a contractor becomes unable to perform on a contract,
normally the government will terminate the contract and repro-
cure the goods or services from another contractor. However,
in certain circumstances a procurement program may be irreparably
or unacceptably damaged to such an extent that such a repro-
curement is not in the government's best interests. In this
situation, the Act empowers the procuring agency or other
appropriate authority to amend the contract with consideration,
and provide the contractor with the additional funds to continue
performance. Thus, the legal basis is provided for a contract
amendment where a contractor's productive ability will be
impaired by an actual or threatened loss , and his continued
performance is essential to the national defense. This adjust-
ment is labeled an amendment without consideration based on the
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essentiality of the contractor. In such, a case, the contract
may be adjusted only to the extent necessary to avoid or
remove the contractor's impairment in productive ability.
An amendment without consideration is also authorized when
a contractor suffers a loss on a contract because of government
action. (This does not imply merely a lessening of anticipated
profits.) This authority is used to provide relief where an
administrative remedy is not otherwise available. For example,
a contractor may have remedy against the government for a breach
of a defense contract because the Navy interferes with the per-
formance of the contract, but he has no administrative remedy
because neither the contracting officer nor the ASBCA has juris-
diction to settle such a claim. This provision may also be
used to provide relief where the government is not legally liable,
but fairness dictates that some adjustment be made. In con-
trast to the above example, concern here is about the accomplish-
ment of a particular program objective and is not relevant to
the issue of whether the government action should be the basis
for granting relief. Rather, fairness is the primary basis
for the adjustment.
Mistakes prior to the award of a negotiated contract
normally do not require a special procedure to be invoked.
With the exception of mistakes amount of less than $1000, the
Comptroller General has ruled that contracting agencies have
no authority to reform contracts on the basis of mistakes dis-
covered after contract award. However, under P.L, 85-804, a
defense contract may be amended or modified to correct or
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mitigate the effect of a mistake, including: a mutual mis-
take concerning material facts, a contractor mistake so ob-
vious it was or should have been apoarent to the contracting
officer, or failure to delineate a covenant in the contract as
both parties understood it. This provision proves a speedy
method for the correction of mistakes, thus avoiding the
necessity of litigation before the courts or appealing to the
GAO.
In contrast to private contractual law, which provides that
acts of an agent of the party may bind the principal, if the
agent had apparent authority to do so, government contract law
states that the government, as a buyer, is not bound by its
agents unless they possess actual authority to bind the govern-
ment. P.L. 85-804 authorizes the formalization of such an in-
formal commitment when it facilitates the national defense.
(3) Residual Powers
The extent of these powers are perhaps the
most difficult to grasp because they are defined by exception.
In the regulations, residual powers are defined as including all
authority under the Act except that part relating to contractual
adjustments and the authority to make advance payments. The
advance payment provision of the Act is almost never used today
and thus is of no further importance here. The contractual
adjustments portion of the Act as discussed in subsection (2)
above (e.g., amendments without consideration, correction of




(_a) Authority to approve actions obligating in excess
of $50,000 shall not be delegated below the Secretarial
level (e.g., for the Navy, SECNAV)
.
(b) Authority to approve actions of $50,000 or less
shall not be delegated below the Head of the Procuring
Agency (for the Navy, Commander of the Systems Commands,
Chief of Naval Research, Aviation Supply Officer, and
Commander Military Sealift Command)
.
(c) Authority to indemnify against nuclear risks shall
be exercised only by the Secretary (e.g., SECNAV)
.
This latter application, indemnification against nuclear risks,
is the most common usage of these powers . Other examples of
the historical employment of these residual powers are as
follows
:
(1) Disposal of government property where such disposal
was not feasible by competitive bidding.
(2) Sale of failities to contractors where it was
uneconomical to relocate them.
(3) Sale of property to government contractors in
isolated areas where supplies were needed for contract
performance and otherwise unobtainable.
(4) Sale of unservicable ammunition parts or scrap to
metal processors to preclude ammunition production
interruption
.
C5) Sale of protective equipement to contractors and
their employees
.
(_6)_ Payment for property requisitioned during combat.
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(7) Lease of property in emergency conditions.
C8) Direct loan to contractors.
(9) Release of chattel mortgages.
(10) Guarantee of loans.
(11) Release of obligation under guarantee loans.
(12) Inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts.
(13) Waiver of restrictions on the purchase of foreign-
made, prison made, and blind made products.
(14) Recession of termination for default and substitution
of termination for convenience of the government.
(15) Settlement and compromise of contract claims.
These examples point up the breadth of situations in which P.L.
85-804 has been employed, and thus help to define the statute's
scope through actual usage. Following the precedence of example
(15) above, SECNAV invoked his residual powers under this act to
settle the major claims under consideration in this thesis.
c. Implementation in DOD
Executive order 10 7 89 authorizes SECDEF and the
Secretaries of the military services to exercise authority of
P.L. 85-804. The implementing directive which further delegates
and delineates the use of this authority within DOD is the DAR.
The Navy Procurement Directives further amplify this delineation
for Navy procurement activities. The thrust of the general
2 6
policy for use of this authority within DOD is as follows:
Control over the exercise of this authority will be
maintained at a high enough, level to insure uniformity
of action; and the Act is not to encourage laxity or
83

carelessness in procurement, matters nor be used when
other adequate legal remedies exist within DOD
.
Further, these directives provide for a contract adjustment
board in each military service.
CI) Navy Contract Adjustment Board
The NCAB is empowered to consider the matters
of contractual adjustment defined above. Subject to the standards
for decision delineated in the DAR, this Board is included within
the meaning of the "Secretarial level" specified in the Act,
and therefore must decide any issue involving more than $50,0 00.
The NCAB is composed of a chairman and between two and six
members appointed by CNM. Exhibit 8 summarizes the actions of
this Board since the beginning of this decade. It is noteworthy
that the Board considered almost 200 cases during this time
which involved monetary settlements. For all cases so consi-
dered, these settlements averaged 17 cents on the dollar. The
exhibit clearly shows that use of P.L. 35-804 within the Navy
is not an uncommon occurrence. One of the settlements discussed
in this thesis was made in part through NCAB action,
d.. Analysis
Although not so categorized either in the Act or
the implementing directives, the authority of P.L. 85-804 may
be categorized into two principal uses of these powers , based
on a historical perspective. The first type of power is
associated with seeking to provide contractual fairness to
defense contractors through, the correction of inequitable
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adjustments concerning amendments without consideration based
on government action, correction of mistakes, and formalization
of informal commitments. It is this type of power that is
exercised on a routine basis by the NCAB . Practice has shown
that the Boards rely on their own judgements in these cases,
using the principle of fairness. In this practive the proce-
dures used by the Board are discretionary: the contractor
generally does not have the right to confront witnesses, re-
buttal of evidence is at the option of the Board, documents
are withheld or disclosed only in special circumstances, and
previous deliberations of the Board are not generally available
to contractors. Even so, the cases processed under these pro-
cedures are generally those for which relief could have been
sought by due process of other laws. Thus, this use of the
power is both expedient and equitable. This non-controversial
use of power has become an integal part of our procurement pro-
cess, therefore has been of continuing benefit, particularly to
small business government contractors
.
The second type of power in this act includes residual
power, the making of advance payments, and the contractual ad-
justments provision to amend contracts without consideration
based on the essentiality of the contractor. It is this power
use which enables public sector management officials to over-
come certain obstables in the attainment of critical procurement
objectives. Generally contractors have not further clear
course for relief under other existing laws, which will equitably
settle the issues while still facilitating the national defense.
86

It is this use of power which generates the heated contro-
versies over P.L. 85-804. Situations have been shown to exist
in which contractors are placed in disadvantageous or tenuous
positions as a result of public sector acquisition policy or
methodolgy. As has been pointed out these decisions are often
by necessity based on speculative estimates concerning future
events. The contractor alone should not be made to suffer the
adverse consequences flowing from such decisions. Therefore,
in the author's view, this use of power is extremely necessary
to our acquisition process, but one which must be used sparingly,
and only then with the keenest sense of managerial judgement.
Thus the use of this power must remain, as it now is, within





CHAPTER III - CASE STUDIES
The objective of this chapter is to present the chronology
of events and analysis of the specific circumstances surroun-
ding the major shipbuilding claims during the period of this
thesis. As a frame of reference, Exhibit 9 shows, in sequence
of award date, the contracts from which these major claims
flowed. These contracts are grouped by contractor in the en-
suing discussions because, in the area of claims, mutual and
cross impacts are exhibited between contracts competing con-
currently for a contractor's resources. Within each contractor
grouping the event chronology is presented first. This chro-
nology terminates with the circumstances surrounding the final
claims settlements. The settlements themselves will be ex-
plored more fully in the next chapter. Each section ends with
a summary of the critical issues on which these settlement
agreements depend.
As shown in Exhibit 9 , three contractors were involved in
these major claims. Insufficient data on the NNSDC claims
were available in the public records for definitive analysis.
Therefore the case studies of this chapter are limited to
Litton Industries, Inc., Ingalls Shipbuilding Division and
General Dynamics Corporation, Electric Boat Division. It is
considered that these two case studies are sufficient to
address the claims settlement initiatives in the next chapter.
As will be seen, a problem experienced by both GD/EB and
Litton/Ingalls concerned their productivity. Their use of
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1. Fixed-price incentive fee contract with escalation.
2. Fixed-price incentive fee, successive targets contract
with escalation.
3. Letter contract for design and long lead time procurement.
Definitization includes construction contract.
4. Contract modification reduced quantity to 5 LHA's.
5. Lead ship design and construction contract.
6. SSN-688 class.
7. Entire inventory of DD-96 3 class.
8. Original contract for 7 SSN's, option exercised for
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it is suggested that Appendix C be reviewed before proceeding
to the case studies themselves. This appendix addresses the
nature of labor in the shipbuilding industry, and thus provides
a background for the problems faced by these contractors.
A. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION/ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION
The Electric Boat Division entered the 1970 's as the fore-
most producer of submarines in the free world. Its current
construction facilities include four covered submarine building
ways, two drydocks, and a floating drydock used for SSN con-
struction. A recent addition has been a Land Level Construction
Facility consisting of an inshore erection area, an outboard
erection area, a graving dock, and pontoon facility being used
for the construction of both SSN's and the Trident SSBM sub-
marines. A separate steel processing facility, located at
Quonset Point, R.I. rounds out EB ' s construction capability.
The parent corporation, General Dynamics, owns another ship-
yard, the Quincy Shipbuilding Division. This shipyard, con-
sisting of five large graving docks with supporting facilities,
did significant business with the Navy (including the con-
struction of SSN's) until 1973. It is currently engaged in
commercial ship construction consisting primarily of Liquid
Natural Gas (LNG) tankers.
Electric Boat Division's previous success in constructing
nuclear submarines is impressive. It was responsible for
designing the Nautilus and 14 subsequent classes of nuclear




22 SSN's, and 27 overhauls/conversions. Largely as a result
of success in the construction of SSBN's and the SSN 6 37 class,
EB realized $125 million in gross profit (3.5 percent) on $3.5
billion in sales during the ten year period from 1967-1976.
With the exception of the claims to be discussed hereafter,
EB submitted five claims for a total amount of $49 million
2 8
over this same ten year period.
Additionally, this shipyard had a reputation for delivering
submarines on or ahead of schedule. Further, the Navy's Board
of Inspection and Survey (BIS) generally lauded the performance
of EB-built submarines during their acceptance tests/trials.
Obviously this shipyard had enjoyed a truly exceptional repu-
tation based on strong and sustained performance.
1. Claim Background/Chronology
The SSN 6 88 class came into being with the award of a
design and lead ship construction contract to NNSDC in February
19_7J1_J Heretofore EB had been the design agent for all new classes
submarines. This decision was a deliberate policy shift within
the Navy, representing the desire to have an alternate source
for submarine design work. A factor bearing on this decision
was the optimistic view that the SSN 688 class was not a radical
departure from, but rather an evolution of the SSN 6 37 class
designed by EB. Overlooked in this view was the close communi-
cation link in submarine design matters which had developed
between EB and the Navy over the years. This new relationship
would thrust EB into the role of follow ship builder. As well,
it placed the Navy in the position of being responsible to EB
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for providing in a timely manner the detailed design drawings
which were being developed by NNSDC . As will be seen, this
change in relationship was to spawn significant problems
.
a. First Flight Contract Award
Three contractors were competing for this first
flight of SSN 6 88 submarines (SSN 688-1) : NNSDC, GD/EB , and
Litton/Ingalls . Substantial competitive pressure existed
among these contractors as they well realized that only two of
the three would receive contract awards. For all practical
purposes, this meant the losing contractor would drop out of
this program, and thus forego the opportunity of substantial
business over the next 15 years.
The contract award criteria were based on ceiling price,
representing a significantly new technique. The result was a
substantially smaller spread between target and ceiling price
for the FPI contract, thus severely limiting the normal flexi-
bility to absorb costs with the conditions of the contract.
Further, the contract contained the pre-1975 escalation clause
which would prove inadequate for the double-digit inflation
experienced particularly in the 1974-1975 timeframe.
On 8 January 1971, SSN 688-1 follow-on construction con-
tracts were awarded to GD/EB for seven vessels and to NNSDC
for four vessels. As a result of the competition, the GD/EB
contract was incentivized to 5.7 percent cost growth over the
target cost while similar provisions for NNSDC provided in-
centive up to one percent over target cost. These data are in
contrast to a typical range of 20-25 percent for FPI shipbuilding
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contracts. At the time of contract award, the employment
level at GD/EB was about 12,000 persons. Further, when the
contract was signed GD/EB had received only 500 of the 5368
detailed design drawings from NNSDC. Two years later fully
50 percent of these drawings were still outstanding. Finally,
in March 1976, five years after contract award, all drawings
were in hand at GD/EB. Compounding this problem of late
arrival of GFI was the number of changes required to the
drawings after receipt. According to one press release the
contractor stated that 35,000 such revisions were required, or
about six revisions per drawing. In rebuttal, the Navy noted
that GD/EB should have expected such revisions, since the SSN
637 class, with GD/EB as the design agent, had required about
five revisions per drawing. Nonetheless, the stage was set
for problems concerning GFI.
b. Second Flight Contract Award
Within DOD and the executive level of the govern-
ment, the view was held that the rapid construction and deploy-
ment of the SSN 6 88 class submarine was vitally important: to
our national security. Concurring with this view, Congress
authorized a total of 11 SSN 688' s to cover the FY 73-74 re-
quirements. The Navy's original desire was to award this second
flight (SSN 6 88-11) to two contractors. Considering the way
SSN 688-1 contracts were split, however, subsequent contractor
bidding strategies would change this view.
In 1973, despite the emerging problems with GFI, optimism
over the construction of these submarines still ran high both
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within the Navy and at GD/EB . Overly optimistic cost reports
and an inadequate cost/schedule control system which failed
to highlight the emerging problems, helped to feed the view
that the SSN 688 class was merely an extension on the SSN 637
class. GD/EB ' s favorable experience with this prior class,
coupled with the then meager (and in retrospect, faulty) data
collected to date on the SSN 688-1 construction, combined to
dominate its bidding strategy.
By contrast, this same period saw a deterioration of re-
lations between the Navy and NNSDC , the only other bidder. NNSDC
took exception to many of the terms and conditions of the RFP
.
Consequently, NNSDC essentially turned out to be non-competitive
in the second flight bidding. Thus, on October 31, 1973, GD/EB
was awarded a FPI contract with escalation for seven SSN 688'
s
with an option for four additional, which was exercised a little
over a month later in December. NNSDC ' s non-competitive bid
had essentially forced the Navy into a sole-source selection
process which awarded all eleven ships of the SSN 68 8-11 pro-
curement to GD/EB.
Taken by themselves, the contractual features for the second
flight might not have proved so inadequate, with the exception
of the pre-1975 escalation clause. These escalation features
were tied to a tight delivery schedule. There was significant
in-house Navy concern over this tight schedule, however, op-
timism and GD/EB' s sole source procurement position overrode
these concerns. Compounding these tight scheduling problems,
GD/EB was awarded the design and construction contract for the
94

lead Trident SSBN in July 1974.
Contractually, the SSN-638-I and II procurements were in a
transition phase of weapons system acquisition policy. This
was the transition from Total Package Procurement to the current
policy. In retrospect, the first 23 of these submarines (18 to
GD/EB under two contracts, and five to NNSDC under two contracts)
had contractual provisions which proved inadequate to cope with
either inflation or other cost increases, thus establishing
the environment for future problems,
c. Emerging Problems
By 1974, production problems on the SSN 688 class
began to surface. The Navy was experiencing problems with the
timely provision of GFI , but because of the optimistic estimates
from GD/EB, the problem was considered to be mainly with NNSDC.
For -instance, the June 1974 contractor's report indicated that
both SSN 688 contracts would be delivered with the contractor's
original manhour estimates for labor. Further, these estimates
indicated that the first SSN 688 would exceed the original cost
projection by 37 percent, but the contractor planned to recover
this on downstream ships. Moreover, GD/EB was reluctant to
acknowledge lost schedule time on these early SSN's. Not until
late 1974 was GD/EB finally to publicly acknowledge that they
were having serious difficulty in meeting these contracts. Not
the least of these difficulties concerned labor problems.
Manpower at GD/EB rose from 12,000 in January 1971 to 18,000
in January 1975 and over 26,000 in January 1977. The firm was
unable to accommodate this rapid manpower rise locally, and
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began such measures as
:
(1) Chartering up to 50 buses a day to bring workers
from as far away as Boston and New York.
(2) Offering bonuses for recruiting welders, including
a $100 savings bond.
Even with these measures recruiting goals fell short. Thus,
using anti-poverty and equal opportunity programs to the maximum,
GD/EB began hiring thousands of formerly hardcore unemployeds
.
Affirmative action programs, requiring the hiring of women and
minorities for federal projects, began changing the work force
of Groton. Consequently, supervisor/trainee ratios changed
from 3:1 to 12:1, with productive time for these supervisors
falling as low as two hours per day, as a result of training
programs and other inefficiencies. At the lower levels idle-
ness became a problem as supervisory capacity was outstripped.
Work disruption from racial incidences and drugs compounded
these management problems. Late arrival of equipment, spurred
in part by the late receipt of GFI , but also due to an in-
efficient inventory control system, exacerbated these labor
difficulties and played havoc with production schedules. As a
result, productivity suffered severely, with a projected growth
over the original contract reaching about 55.5 million manhours
at an increased cost of $830M in current year dollars.
In October 1977, General Dynamics changed managers at
Electric Boat for the third time in four years. This new
manager was Mr. P. Takis Veliotis , the former manager of their
very successful Quincy Shipbuilding Division. Mr. Veliotis
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brought in eight managers from Quincy to form his top manage-
ment team. As one of his first acts, Mr. Veliotis immediately
fired 2,000 salaried employees. Lay-offs rapidly spread to
the blue collar workers, reaching a total of 5000.
The Navy began an analysis of these problems in late 1974.
Throughout much of this analysis process, discussions with the
contractor relating to causes were acrimonious, with both sides
taking adamant positions concerning blame. In retrospect, the
problems were caused by both Navy and contractor actions with
additional problems lying beyond the control of either party.
Thus the ensuing final settlements did not, indeed could not,




In February 1975, GD/EB submitted its first of two
claims on the SSN 688-1 contract. The claimed amount was $220
million. The principal basis for the claim was that late and
defective GFI resulted in ship delivery date extensions and
additional work. In April 1976, this claim was settled for $97M,
using the claim settlement procedures described in the last
chapter. As a further condition of this settlement, the Navy
allowed a schedule slippage of 12 months on each ship. In return,
GD/EB with limited exceptions , released the government from
future claims on the SSN 6 88-1 contract for events through
May 1975.
The government realized that GD/EB was continuing to incur
losses, and consequently more claims would be forthcoming. Thus,
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in late April 1976, DEPSECDEF Clements, with the intention of
using P.L. 85-804, offered to settle all outstanding claims
against both contracts for $178 million. Further specific
details of this proposal will be discussed in the next chapter.
In summary, since GD/EB was estimating its losses at the time
of this proposal to be $142M, they were willing to accept Mr.
Clement's offer. As will be shown, Mr. Clements failed in his
attempt, setting the stage for further claims.
In December 1976, GD/EB submitted its second major claim
for a total of $544M, broken down as follows:
(a) SSN 688-1 contract ($12lM) based on delay and
disruption costs due to design changes subsequent to
May 20, 1975, principally caused by an inadequate
interval between lead ship at NNSDC and the SSN 699-1
contract award.
(b) SSN 688-11 contract ($432M) based on delay and
disruption costs resulting from delivery delays of the
SSN 688-1 ships.
Independent of these claims, in January 19 77, GD/EB filed
an appeal to the ASBCA on a contracting officer decision dis-
allowing certain overhead charges to the two contracts. Subse-
quently, in February and October 1977, GD/EB filed appeals on
two more contracting officer's decisions disallowing overhead
charges . Both of these appeals were combined under the January
appeal. When all claims were finally settled by other means,
discovery proceedings were underway on this appeal in preparation
for an ASBCA hearing to determine entitlement, and not amount.
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In March 1977, the second major claim discussed above was
assigned to the Navy Claims Settlement Board (NCSB) . By January
1978, the Board had completed its evaluation of this 20 volume
claim. Fourteen months after this $544 million claims was
filed, the Navy had evaluated its worth, under the rules of
entitlement, at $125 million.
Late in October 1978 ASN (M,RA&L) Hidalgo began preliminary
discussions with high level General Dynamics officials regarding
these claims. Meanwhile, GD/EB ' s new management team was still
attempting to clearly define the magnitude of the problem. As
a result of an audit conducted by the shipyard's auditing firm,
Arthur Anderson and Company, and as confirmed by the independent
auditing firm, Coopers and Lybrand , GD/EB informed the Navy
that is incurred losses through December 1977 on the two con-
tracts was $1,341 billion. Subsequently, based on a complete
material inventory in January 1973 (the first one in over 10
years), GD/EB revised its projected losses on the two contracts
to $981 million and advised the Navy of an additional schedule
slippage on both the SSN 688 and Trident contracts. In its
March issuance of its public fiscal statements for FY 1977,
GD/EB again revised its estimated loss on these contracts to
$834 million, noting that this lower estimate was based on
more realistic evaluations of charges due to labor and material
inflation.
Later in March, GD/EB broke off negotiations with the Navy,
informing them of the intention to stop work on these contracts
as of April 12, 1973, by reason of incurring over $16 million
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per month in unreimbursed costs. Thereafter, GD/EB agreed to
a two months' moratorium on this stop work order which would
have laid off from eight to fourteen thousand workers. In
exchange, the Navy agreed to a provisional payment of $66.5
million on both contracts with an immediate payment of $25
million. At the same time, GD/EB advised the Navy that it was
preparing claims for an additional $750 million.
Negotiations with Secretary Hidalgo continued, and in
June 1978, SECNAV Claytor notified Congress of his intent to
use P.L. 85-804. At GAO ' s suggestion, the Navy requested a
DCAA audit of these claims in July 1978. A week later the
completed audit questioned $36.8 million of the allowed costs
certified by the Coopers and Lybrand firm. By this time how-
ever, the negotiations with Secretary Hidalgo had progressed
too far to consider these costs. Thus, they were not considered
in the ensuing agreement which was reached on June 9, 1978. The
negotiations and agreement will be discussed in Chapter IV.
2. Critical Issues
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to review and
consolidate the critical issues of GD/EB SSN 688 contracts:
(a) GD/EB management misjudged the complexity of the
SSN 688 in its proposal and thus was unable to effectively
control productivity during construction.
(b) The bid strategies of GD/EB and NNSDC resulted in
the less than desirable option of awarding all 11 ships
cf the SSB 688-11 contract to GD/EB.
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(c) The Navy decision to use an alternate desig.
choice for the SSN 688 resulted in significant
additional costs to GD/EB despite the Navy's subse-
quent efforts to improve this situation.
(d) Lateness of GFI had a serious disruptive and
delaying impact on GD/EB.
(e) The protection against inflation provided by the
escalation clauses were inadequate to properly com-
pensate the contractor for his costs
.
(f) The above problems were compounded by the
restrictive contract structures , and the inadequate
productivity of a rapidly expanding work force.
These considerations are germane to the negotiations and
settlement yet to be discussed.
B. LITTON INDUSTRIES/INGALLS SHIPBUILDING DIVISION
Litton Industries is a technologically-oriented corporation
which has a history of achieving growth through the develop-
ment of new products for new or old markets, or improving
existing products . The corporation has a history of acquiring
other companies whose products or future might benefit from
technological innovations or management concepts. It has a
history of heavy and diverse involvement in defense contracts
.
In following its normal growth pattern, the corporation
acquired Ingalls Shipbuilding in the mid-1960s having considered
its prior involvement in Navy shipbuilding and with the know-
ledge of DOD evolving TPP policies. At the time of this
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acquisition, Ingalls shipyard consisted of a 168 acre east-
bank plant having six conventional, inclined building ways
and a small graving dock.
Litton 's marketing reviews had concluded early in 1967
that the best strategv for acquisition of multishio contracts
was to construct a new shipbuilding facility. Following an
engineering planning study of a new shipbuilding facility,
Litton announced a corporate decision in October 1967, to build
a new in-line yard, regardless of whether it was awarded the
government business then in competition. In 1967, the State
of Mississippi offered a $130 million bond issue for the ac-
quisition of 611 acreas on the west bank of the Pascagoula
River and the construction of shipyard facilities thereon. In
accordance with Litton 's plans, and being hailed as the ship-
yard of the future, the facility was designed to use relatively
new high-technology modular techniques, establish logical
material flow patterns, and, in concept, gain the advantages
of assembly line techniques. Litton leased this facility for
40 years (with the option of 37 more years) , for the annual
rent of $9 million; an amount equal to the annual bond sinking
fund requirements. Thus, Litton financed this facility ex-
pansion with tax-free bonds.
1. Claim Backgound and Chronology
In 1966, the Navy announced its plans to develop the
LHA under TPP concepts. Litton/Inqalls and two other firms
were actively engaged in the contract definition and bid
procedures for the next two and a half years. In retrospect,
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Litton/Ingalls underbid this contract for several reasons.
Their estimates of learning efficiencies connected with new
ships, at a new yard, with new modular concepts proved over-
optimistic. The extent and complexity of the design effort
were not well understood. Further, estimates on the numerous
variables of this project demanded many subjective judgements
which were not made wisely. Even so, subsequent analysis by
the Navy claims team did not find intentional underbiding on
either this competition, or the DD 963 program which was following
the LHA by about one year.
A part of Litton/Ingalls bid strategy included the plan to
construct these ships at their new west bank facility. Prelimi-
nary design of the facility was completed rapidly and construction
started in January 1968. By August 196 9 the steel fabrication
shops and assembly areas were complete to the point that steel
fabrication and assembly could commence.
Significant construction costs for this facility were
incurred. These costs were subsequently to be known as Manu-
facturing Process Development (MPD) costs. In essence, these
costs were start up costs associated with the new industrial
process, and thus should have been associated with the first
units constructed using the process. The first units so con-
structed were commercial ships for the President Lines and
Farrell Lines.
Litton/Ingalls ' interpretation of MPD was different from
the above. According to the contractor, MPD costs were the
difference between the commercial ships as built and their
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cost as bid. Through this interpretation, Litton/Ingalls
later asserted that a portion of the $133 million costs were
attributable to the government. Although Litton/Ingalls never
submitted a formal claim for these costs, they were the sub-
ject of subsequent settlement negotiations, during which the
contractor firmly held that their intention was to submit
such a claim in the future,
a. Contract Awards
In May 1969, Litton/Ingalls was awarded a multiyear
29FPI contract, wxth successive target and escalation provisions
for nine LHAs
.
Shortly thereafter, in June 1970, Litton/Ingalls
was awarded the same type of contract for thirty DD 963 class
destroyers. In January 1971, pursuant to the contract, the
Navy cancelled four of the nine LHAs. These were the only
two contracts awarded using the TPP policy. Under this policy,
the contracts contained the Total System Responsibility (TSR)
clause, which, as discussed earlier in Chapter II, involved
radically different roles for both the contractor and the
Navy. Both parties would have difficulties fulfilling these
roles
.
As a frame of reference for the ensuing discussion, Exhibit
10 shows the major alterations in ceiling prices of these
two contracts
.
The reset prices in Exhibit 10 were pursuant to the "succes-
sive target" provision of the contracts. The reset timing
normally should occur when the first production model is com-




LHA/DD 96 3 CEILING PRICES
Original Reset As of Notes
Contract $ (M) 1 May 73
($M) ($ M)
LHA 1999 795 825 1,2
DD 963 2140 2156 2869 3,4
Notes
:
1. Price reset modification occurred on February 2 8,
1973 and included 338 changes. This reset included
the reduction from nine to five ships.
2. The May 1978 price includes 460 priced modifications
3. Price reset modification occurred on July 23, 1975
based on work through April 19 74, and 4 23 priced
modifications through that date.
4. The May 19 78 price included 1176 additional oriced
modifications
.
These prices were reset in accordance with the original schedule
delineated in the contracts. However, the LHA program ex-
perienced significant schedule slippages, to the point that
when LHA-1 was launched in December 1974, (ten months after the
reset price determination) , it was only 36 percent physically
complete. Seventy percent completion had been planned at this
point. Thus, at the time of price reset significant production
costs remained unknown. The reset price issue was clouded by
change order pricing, and the contract repricing necessary from
the cancellation of four LHA ' s from the original contract. As
will be seen, these matters became insurmountable sources of
disagreement within the bounds of the contract.
The contracts also contained the pre-1975 escalation clause.
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As was the case with GD/EB ' s SSN 688 contracts, schedule
slippages on the LHA/DD 9 63 programs combined with double
digit inflation again showed the inequity of this clause, and
proved to be a substantial hardship to the contractor,
b. Contract Performance
From the beginning, the LHA design effort did not
proceed as originally conceived. In November 1969, the number
of technical problems reported by the contractor was growing.
Recognizing this inadequate progress, the contractor reorganized
his LHA program office, effectively eliminating the formal en-
gineering review of design integration section.
To overcome these problems in system design, the contractor
and the Navy jointly agreed to conduct an on-site review (OSR)
.
This review was completed in August 1971, and generated over
2900 documented Navy comments on the drawinqs and snecif ications
.
Thus the Naw , through qrowina concerns, became involved in
the design process. This involvement would ultimately be mani-
fested in the following ways
:
(1) The contract called for Quarterly Progress Reviews (QPR)
wherein the contractor summarized his progress. Originally
these reviews were expected to take one day. The Navy de-
cided to institute OSR's as a part of the QPR's, thus ex-
tending the review time to four days. Sixty-four such reviews
were conducted during the first two years of the contract,
resulting in an average of 48 contractor action items for
each review.
(2) The Navy conducted audits and reviews of the contractor's
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design efforts which resulted in over 3000 comments to
which the contractor had to respond,
(3) The Navy issued almost 700 comments on 100 subcontractor
procurement specifications, and held up consent to such
contracts until such comments were resolved to the Navy's
satisfaction.
(4) Many formal change proposals not authorized by the
contract were required.
(5) Changes were required to the contractor's quality con-
trol procedures. These chanaes were not anticipated at
contract award.
(6) Twenty unanticipated changes to the LHA Program Plan
were reauired prior to final acceptance.
There was little disagreement from either of the parties that the
above Navy involvement was beyond the relevant contractual pro-
visions of TPP. However, the Navv steadfastly maintained that
this involvement was promoted by the contractor's inadequate
performance
.
These design and fabrication problems caused an eight month
slippage in the start of construction. As construction began,
the problem of insufficient skilled manpower came to the fore.
The contractor's original plan was to emoloy an integrated work
force using as the experienced core the skilled labor from their
east bank yard. These workers were exoected to be available as
the result of an east bank reduction in force in 1970. This re-
duction did not occur until later than planned.
Further, during the 1970 's the gulf coast labor market
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hovered near the full employment level. There were few unemployed
skilled individuals available, and Litton/Ingalls wage rates
were not competitive with the higher rates paid by other em-
ployers in the market area for the services of skilled craftsmen.
In addition, employment at the shipyard may not have been attrac-
tive for reasons unrelated to wages. The outside work in the
yard was physically demanding, commutina distances and time were
substantial within the market area, and morale problems within
the work force were in evidence.
In the west bank shipvard , the actual skill level drooped
below the level inherent in the LHA bid standards. The ratio of
skilled workers to total work force was found to varv up to
five percent below the normal. These low skill levels reduced
productivity. A sufficient number of skilled shioworkers could
not be drawn from the local and gulf coast labor markets. This
situation was not corrected by Litton/Ingall ' s later attempts
to recruit nationwide.
In addition to these labor problems, Litton/Ingalls encountered
management problems with the new facilities. In March 1971, the
contractor announced that a major component of his modular con-
struction plan was being discontinued and revised because it had
not worked on the Farrell Lines commercial construction. Due to
this revision, outfitting was not accomplished on the LHA-1
as planned. Both work force requirements and skill levels were
higher than original estimates, and the "break-in" period for
bringing this modular operation to steadv state was delaved . By
Julv 1972, it became evident that the shipyard operations were
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plagued by errors in the manufacturing process and a lack of
viable production control planning. Litton/Ingalls was clearly
unable to meet its original delivery schedule.
These schedule and production problems cascaded through the
LHA's, eventually reaching the DD contract. Litton/Ingalls'
original plan called for the transition of the shipyard facility
to the DD construction during 1974, such that all module assembly
areas and the ship integration area would be completely DD-
dedicated by the end of that year. This process began in 1972,
but because of the LHA schedule slippage, the original plans
were altered to the extent that the facility would not be totally
dedicated to DD construction at anytime during the life of the
contract. As a result, the total slippage of the LHA and DD
programs were six years and two years, respectively, over the
original contracted dates
.
In an attempt to normalize the administration of the contract,
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was negotiated in a series of
meetings in early 1971, being signed by both parties in April.
It reaffirmed the conditions of the contract and established
firm guidelines for conduct of QPR's, a new five ship schedule
incorporating the ten month delay of LHA-1, and revised require-
ments for proposing a contract reset. In addition, the MOA con-
tained several provisions designed to normalize and improve
the processing of changes and the Government's administration of
the LHA contract.
The truce this MOA provided was shortlived, and the stage was




d. Claims and Litigation
Almost since contract inception, delays and cost
increases had engendered charge and countercharge. During
five years of proceedings, the legal actions arising out of these
contracts were staggering: five ASBCA proceedings; a NCAB pro-
ceeding; two cases in the Court of Claims; four cases in Federal
District Court; and two appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court.
Appendix D is a summary of these actions and their status when
final settlement was concluded in 1978. As review of this appen-
dix shows, many of these actions were only at the threshold
stage with respect to resolution. Navy estimates were that
this litigation would have taken eight to ten years to run its
full course.
In March 1972, Litton/Ingalls presented its reset proposal
on the LHA contract in accordance with the successive target
provision of the contract and the April 1971 MOA addressed pre-
viously. Included with this reset proposal was a claim. This
claim indicated that, because of government actions, there
should be a fully escalated ceiling price adjustment to the
contract of $475 million. The parties tried but failed to reach
agreement during these negotiations. As a result, the contracting
officer reset the contract price by unilateral decision on
February 28, 1973. As well, he raised the price to the contracted
ceiling, awarded $19 million for changes, and made no price
adjustment for changes, but allowed six months delay in the
schedule as having been government caused. Further, he awarded
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the maximum adjustment allowed in the contract for the can-
cellation of the four ships - $109 million. Finally, the con-
tracting officer concluded that, in accordance with the provisions
of the contract, Litton/Ingalls had received $55 million in
excess progress payments, which he demanded that the contractor
return. The repercussions from this decision were swift, and
started a chain of litigative/administrative actions.
Litton/Ingalls held that the contract adjustment price should
have been $20 million more. The contractor filed an appeal on
the entire decision to the ASBCA, incorporating not only their
disagreement with the contracting officer's decision, but their
claim for contract price adjustment as well by reasons of de-
fective specifications, constructive changes, and late or de-
fective GFI. This claim was updated several times, becoming
Litton/Ingalls general claim against the government on this con-
tract. Also, Litton/Ingalls filed suit in the Court of Claims
against the ASBCA findings, an action which was in suspension,
and subsequently withdrawn when the claims were settled by other
means in 1978. Even further, the contractor sued in Southern
Mississippi District Court, seeking judicial relief from the
contracting officer's decision. The District Court stepped the
Navy from recouping the $55 million overpayment, but, on appeal,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The
Navy withheld progress payments until the overpayment had been
recovered, which caused cash flow problems for the contractor.
For almost three years Litton/Ingalls pursued these claims
before the ASBCA. Additionally, various informal avenues of
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relief were sought at higher levels in the Navy. For example,
in February 1975, the contractor filed a "reset proposal",
asserting inequities in the contract formation, and thus seeking
contract reformation under P.L. 85-804, In essence, the govern-
ment took no related action on this proposal until mid-1976.
In January 1976, the Navy and Litton/Ingalls agreed to a plan
of action whereby the ASBCA case would be suspended and both
parties would seek a negotiated settlement on the claims , which
were then valued at $505 million. The negotiations were unsuccess-
ful, and the plan of action failed.
In April 1976, DEPSECDEF Clements proposed the use of P.L.
85-804 to settle these claims. Through the use of the newer
escalation clause, the offer would have provided substantial cash
flow benefit, but it amounted to only $239 million of the claim
the contractor valued at over $500 million. Litton/Ingalls
considered this offer inequitable and rejected it. The proposal
was subsequently withdrawn, still leaving the contractor with
severe cash flow problems.
In late June 1976, plagued by these cash flow problems which
were aggravated by receiving only 2 5 percent of their costs under
the contractual agreements and dissatisfied with the progress
towards claims settlement, the contractor notified the Navy of
his intent to stop work on the LHA contract. Supporting this
action, the contractor asserted that the underlying causes were,
in effect, breach of contract by the government. The Navy and
the Justice Department through injunctive relief action in the




continue work, but the order required the Navy to pay the
actual costs of performance. These costs were subsequently
defined as 91 percent of the invoiced costs. In the fall of
1977, after more than a year of legal entanglement, the con-
tractor was still receiving 91 percent of costs. At that time
the court order was scheduled to expire on October 31, 1977.
(It was subsequently extended to the end of July 1973.) This
court action was the subject of a governmental appeal to the
Fifth Circuit Court. The appeal challenged the lower court's
authority to impose any cost reimbursement requirement on the
Navy as a condition of injunctive relief.
Finally, through negotiations beginning in October 1977, the
Navy and the contractor reached agreement on the issue of progress
payments and reflected their decisions in a iMemorandum of Decision
dated January 18, 1978. The agreed rate of cost compensation
was 75 percent of invoiced costs. Since this was a P.L. 85-804
settlement of over $25 million, hearings were held before the
House Armed Services Committee on 7 March 1978. Congress did not
disapprove. The modification was implemented in April 1978,
thus paving the way for addressing the central issue of the claims
themselves.
Navy efforts to analyze these claims, ongoing for several
years were intensified as a part of the plan of action referred
to above. A claims team was formed in NAVSEA and began their
analysis on January 1, 1976. This was to be a two year effort,
involving at times more than 200 people. The effort was hampered
by the slow submission of documentation from the contractor, the
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last increment of which was received in September 1977. Another
factor slowing this effort was the necessity to research and respond
to the many requests for information/material to support the
several administrative/litigative actions on-going during this
timeframe. Further, it is noteworthy that this team was subject
to the review and administrative procedures addressed in Chapter
II. The documentation resulting from the Board's actions is
dramatic. When finally packed for shipment to the archives, this
documentation filled 26 trunks!
In April 1978, the analysis was completed. It showed a
justification for $312 million of the claims which, by this time,
had grown to $1,088 billion. These results were delivered to
ASN (M,RA&L), Secretary Hidalgo who had been conducting negotiations
with Litton/Ingalls since September 1977 . Since the effects of
the 1973 contracting officer's decision regarding delay and a
$20 million provisional payment had to be netted out, the analysts
concluded that $265 million in entitlement could be properly
factored into these negotiations. These negotiations were con-
summated in a final agreement on June 22, 1978. Both the nego-




Several key issues emerge from the foregoing case
study. These key issues are:
(a) Total Package Procurement did not succeed. The
unique complexity of shipbuilding made TPP particularly
unsuitable for these programs.
(b) It is highly questionable that the necessary design
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process could have been accomplished without Navy
involvement. Much of this involvement exceeded the
relevant contractual provisions, and thus constituted
constructive changes to the contract.
(c) Neither the LHA nor the DD 963 programs could have
been constructed for the cost, and with the schedule
specified in the original contracts.
(d) Once the delays occurred, the contracts did not
provide adequate protection against inflation, and even
less so, the double digit inflation of the mid-1907s.
The result was significant cost overruns, schedule slippages and




CHAPTER IV. CLAIM SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS
In the early spring of 1976, congressional hearings for the
FY 1977 budgetary appropriations were in full swing. Defense
Department officials were actively engaged in the hearings before
the House and Senate Armed Services Committee on the military
authorizations in the proposed budget. The Navy was experiencing
its usual difficulties in addressing its shipbuilding claims,
which by this time had grown to a little over $1.4 billion. Con-
sequently, the Navy presentations emphasized the recent changes
in the weapons acquisition policy and contracting methods instituted
since 1973. The FFG-7 program was highlighted frequently, ex-
tolling the success of the land based test sight and "lead-follow
ships" concept. Lengthy presentations were made on the effects
of inflation, and the institution of the 1975 escalation clause
as a far superior means of coping with this problem. Studies
were cited which addressed the causes of claims, and the several
measures under consideration to avoid future claims.
However, in the area of claims settlement, the picture was
not bright. Among the three major shipbuilding contractors,
only GD/EB could be singled out as a significant success in
settling claims. This was the recent $97 million settlement of
GD/EB ' s $220 million claim on the SSN 688 contract submitted in
May of 1975. But this success had paled with GD/EB ' s recent
notification that another claim for about $300 million was in
i
preparation.
By contrast, Litton/Ingalls had been pursuing its claims of
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over $500 million both before the ASBCA and in the courts for
the past four years with little success. The multi-disciplined
claims settlement team had just been formed in January; the
same month that Litton/Ingalls agreed to submit the full docu-
mentation of their claims. This documentation had just started
to trickle in.
At NNSDC , the situation was just as bleak. The company
had claims outstanding for $894 million. All but $69 million
of these claims had been submitted over the preceding nine months,
with three-fourths of them having been received by the Navy within
the previous two months. These claims involved the six contracts
listed in Exhibit 9 for NNSDC. In total, these claims covered
64 thick volumes. The largest of these claims - $221 million
on the CVN 68 and 69 contract - was filed in late February to-
gether with 16 volumes of documentation. In the 18 Ma" 1976
Senate Congressional Record, Senator Proxmire noted the following
disquieting facts relevant to the NNSDC claims
:
(1) Statements accompanying the claims were filled with
disclaimers indicating the company could not prove the
Navy owed the amounts alleged.
(2) Regarding the CGN claim, the company stated that
documented analysis was based on contemporary and working
files which might be lost when the ships went into final
completion. Further, the contractor acknowledged that some
error may have been made in its estimates, and thus the




(3) The company also admitted that some errors may exist
in its SSN claims, and thus its conclusions could not be
proven with certainty.
(4) The company refused to certify that its claims were
current, complete, and correct in a sworn affidavit. This
certification was required by Navy Procurement Directives
prior to claims evaluation.
From these observations, Senator Proxmire concluded that it was
a part of the company's strategy to withhold supplying the Navy
with documentation of their claims in order to delay or prevent
a thorough investigation and audit of the claims.
The company itself left little doubt about its intentions.
It intended to use all means at its disposal to force settlement
of its claims. In late summer of 1975, partially to emphasize
the cash flow consequences from these claims, NNSDC stopped work
on the CGN-41, stating that this option from the CGN 38-40 con-
tract was invalid. Construction was resumed through court order.
As a part of this court finding, both parties agreed to negotiate
32in good faith. " On the day following its submission of the
CVN 68/69 claim, NNSDC ' s president, Mr. John P. Diesel, sent a
letter to the Chief of Naval Operations indicating that the ship-
yard was considering stopping work on the CVN 7 and entering
into no more Navy contracts until its claims were resolved.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Diesel summed up his policy in a letter
| to Congressman Downing stating "I need to bring all pressure to
bear that I can for a prompt and equitable resolution of the
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Clearly, in the year and a half since the 1974 Seapower
Subcommittee hearings, the Navy had made little progress in the
settlement of its shipbuilding claims. This lack of progress
spurred deeper involvement at the DOD level , and produced three
initiatives, two of which ultimately resulted in the settlement
of these claims. This chapter explores these initiatives in
more detail.
A. FIRST INITIATIVE - P.L. 85-804 34
1. Background
In mid-March 1976, Senator Stennis, Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, indicated in a letter to SECDEF Rumsfeld
that, "The committee would like to address the status and the
role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to
the management of the Navy shipbuilding program. As you know,
in its report last year on shipbuilding the committee emphasized,
that, the 'ultimate responsibility for approval, management, and
program execution lies with the Secretary of Defense'." Responsive
action was swift. On 30 March 1976 DEPSECDEF Clements appointed
a shipbuilding Executive Committee to guide and monitor the
actions of the Navy Department. This committee was chaired by
Mr. F. A. Shronz, ASN(ISL), and had as its members:
Mr. R. A. Wiley - General Counsel, DOD
Mr. G. D. Penisten - ASN (FM)
Mr. W. K. Brehm - ASD (LA)
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ADM F, H. Michaelis, USN - CHNAVMAT
VADM R. C. Gooding, USN - COMNAVSEASYSCOM
VADM E. T. Rich, USN (Ret) - Consultant
Supporting this committee was a working group chaired by RADM
L. E. Hopkins, USN, DEPCOMNAVSEASYSCOM for Contracts. Secretary
Clements ' charge to the committee directed that they examine
those shipbuilding contracts entered into in the 1968-73 time-
frame to determine how to reform them, and in particular, to
provide for escalation recovery which reflected the 197 5 escalation
clause methodology. This guidance was specific and heavily
slanted towards the employment of P.L. 85-804. This guidance
notwithstanding, the Navy presented for committee consideration,
three approaches to the resolution of these claims:
(1) Define all administrative and other means of
shortening the claims process while still maintaining
the quality of this process. This was called the
accelerated claims process.
(2) To ease contractor cash flow problems, explore
using provisional payments, to be paid incrementally
based on claims evaluation to date, and as the
evaluation progressed.
(3) Reformation of the contracts using P.L. 35-804.
Obviously, in view of the guidance cited earlier, the latter
approach was selected. Pre-negotiation work was begun by both
the Executive Committee and the working group with contractor
representatives employing only the narrow guidelines of evaluating
the monetary effects of substituting the newer escalation clause
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into the 1968-73 contracts causing claims problems.
On 20 April 1976, DEPSECDEF Clements responded to Senator
3 6Stennis ' letter. In part this response stated:
In sum, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Rumsfeld and I share
the concerns you raised in you March 19th letter in regard
to DOD's management of the Navy shipbuilding program. We
recognize the responsibility we have on an immediate basis
to initiate corrective action to surmount what constitutes
a serious threat to our national defense. In February, I
officially alterted the Secretary of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations of my determination to take
remedial action. On 2 4 March, I informed them that I have
determined — that because of this threat to our national
defense and also in equity to rectify certain injustices
or unfair consequences that have flowed to certain ship-
builders — to take action under P.L. 35-804....
This letter was followed at the end of April by the formal
notification letters to Congress of the intent to use this law.
Reaction to this proposal was, at best, mixed, as indicated by
the following excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee's
37initial hearings at the end of April:
Senator Symington: As we understand Secretary Clements' testimony
he is saying that he will formally invoke Public Law 35-8 04
in the next few days, but he will not know all the details,
including how much money to pay the shipbuilders , for another
30-45 days. This means the 60 day clock will start running
now, but Congress won't know what the Defense Department plans
to spend, which could be as much as a $1.7 billion backlog,
it won't know this for 30-45 days. Doesn't this procedure
make it impossible for Congress to judge the Defense Depart-
ment proposal until shortly before the 60 days period expires?
Mr. Clements: ...I agree that this is a rather fuzzy area. And
what I guess I need is some advice in consultation here.
Because our anticipation here is that we really need $500 to
$700 million to settle this $1.8 billion of claims. So since
this procedure has never been done before in this particular
endeavor for the Department of Defense,... I really don't
know how to proceed in this regard. We don't want to put
a definite number in there, because our negotiations with the
shipyards are not complete. We think we know within reasonable
ranges what we are doing and where it is going to come out.
But we can't say positively. I would like to bracket what we
are asking for under our request ... and say that we would like
authority to go up to $700 million.
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Senator Symington: I am only asking for information. But the
answer to my question would be yes . , . . I never heard about
any of this until this morning, you and I never discussed
it ... .
Senator Leahy: On the specifics of it, then the Navy at some
point has said 'all right, we maintain we owe something on
those contracts.' ....and they must have said - at least
made a proposal - that they owe a specific amount. Can we
get those specifics that the Navy has?
Mr. Clements: No... because we have not reached that point. These
claims have to go through a very set procedure, and be
thoroughly documented and they have to be analyzed, and
so forth. And so they have not made a counter proposal....
Senator Leahy: Are you saying that (on) the $1.8 billion worth
of claims, the Navy hasn't even reached some kind of conclusion
about what they figured they owe on them? And we are going
to wrap the whole thing up in 90 days after we get approval
from Congress. It just doesn't make sense.
Mr. Clements: It really does.
Senator Leahy: It must be the Navy is going to be able to move
a lot faster than I have ever seen them do in anything else
before.
Mr. Shronz : One of the problems, Senator Leahy, is that many of
the claims have just been received in the last 60 or 90
days. They have not been analyzed, and one of the problems
we have is the time it takes for the process of initial
adjudication and negotiation to occur. In many cases we are
talking about several years on a claim-by-claim analysis
before we have a really good understanding of what the claim
content is, and at least a Navy view as to what its true
value is. The purpose of reforming contracts is partly to
avoid the necessity of going through that process, but also
to put into the contracts ... a deterrent to ... additional
claims ....
Secretary Clements ended these hearings with the statement of his
intent to return to Congress between 5 and 10 June with the
details of the proposed agreements.
With this congressional notification of the intent to use
P.L. 85-804 in the absence of settlement amounts, the door for
public debate was opened, even while negotiations with the
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contractors were in progress. Although the highest levels within
the Navy supported this claims settlement methodology, this
support was by no means uniform. As in 1974, ADM Rickover again
was the focal point of the dissenting view. In responding to
a request from Congressman Aspen, RADM Rickover wrote a 13 page
letter dated 17 May 1976. This letter reinforced his 1974 Sea-
3 8power Subcommittee testimony, stating in part:
I believe the Navy would be better off if it would insist
on compliance with its contracts -- in federal court if
necessary -- to maintain a normal basis for conducting
future business ...
-if contractors believe they will be
excused from their contractual obligations by submitting
inflated claims, refusing to honor contracts, complaining
to higher authority and the like, they and others will be
encouraged to follow this approach in the future.
The day after this letter was made public, Secretary Clements
encountered substantial opposition during his testimony on this
issue before the House Seapower Subcommittee. Clearly there was
growing congressional skepticism and acrimony concerning this
proposal.
Two weeks later, Mr. Gordon Rule (a high ranking civil ser-
vant with the Navy) , in a speech before the Shipbuilders Council
of America, supported Secretary Clements' proposal and strongly
criticized ADM Rickover ' s views. In the following week, strong
congressional objections were voiced over Mr. Rule's attack on
ADM Rickover, with Congressman Minisk publicly asking for Mr.
Rule's "immediate resignation" from public service.
Undeterred, a week later ADM Rickover continued to press his
position in testimony before the Joint Economic Subcommittee on
Priorities and Economy in Government, stating in part: "I think
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this could be one of the biggest ripoffs in the history of the
United States." 39
Thus, this proposed use of P.L. 85-804 had become a politically
sensitive issue, due in no small measure to the publicly expressed,
divergent opinions within DOD. The Congress was divided on the issue.
This divergence of opinion was never put to a vote however,
because on June 9th, Secretary Clements communicated to the Con-
gress the withdrawal of his notification of intent to use P.L.
85-804. The reason given was that the government and the contractors
had failed to reach agreement on the negotiated amounts for
settlement
.
From the outset of this proposal, Secretary Clements had held
that the settlements would not be pursued in a piecemeal fashion;
it was to be a settlement of all the major claims, or settlement
of none of them. Under the pre-establihsed guidelines from
Secretary Clements, the government negotiators could only offer
amounts which would result from the substitution of a new esca-
lation caluse. In the case of GD/EB , these escalation payments
would have amounted to $178 million. Since GD/EB had not clearly
defined the magnitude of its problems at that time, the company
estimated its losses at $142 million, and was therefore willing
to accept the government's offer.. The Navy estimated escalation
payments to Litton/Ingalls would, total $239 million. This com-
pany had claims outstanding for over $500 million. In a public
statement following the negotiations, Secretary Clements noted
that the two parties' positions differed by $200 million. Thus,
Litton/Ingalls rejected the proposal. With NNSDC the published
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difference in negotiated positions was about $100 million,
40
causing this company to reject the proposal. The first
initiative to settle these claims had failed.
2 . Analysis
Why did this attempt fail? On the surface, the rationale
of retrofitting into these contracts an escalation clause which is
now in wide usage is intuitively appealing. The reason for
failure is that by pursuing settlement through escalation only,
all of the claims elements were not addressed. Delay, disruption
and constructive change order costs were also a major part of
these claims. The new escalation clause alone simply could not
justify a government negotiated position high enough to settle
equitably the costs flowing from these other claims elements.
But in order to establish a Navy position on these other
claims elements, a full evaluation of the claims would be necessary,
It was precisely this lengthy evaluative process that the esca-
lation clause approach to settlement sought to avoid. The
hearings on this proposal clearly indicated the indefensibility
of a failure to evaluate the claims. The Congress left no
doubt that the validity of the claims had to be established
in order to prevent the misuse of government funds. Therefore,
the only procedure available for establishing a government position
relative to claim validity was through the entitlement process
of claims evaluation.
Other facets of these events are also important. First,
from the April 29th hearings before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, it is apparent that DOD advance liaison with the
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Congress on this matter had either been ineffective or inade-
quate. This left open to question in the minds of several con-
greemen the basic wisdom of this proposed solution. This skep-
ticism should not have been unanticipated in view of extreme
congressional controversy in prior years over the use of this
law to settle large claims in the aircraft industry.
Secondly, the notification of Congress of the intent to use
this law prior to reaching a negotiated position with the con-
tractors proved to be a strategic error. Such negotiations
would have shown the inadequacy of escalation clause substitution
alone to solve the total problem. By this early notification
however, the forum was provided for heightened congressional in-
terest and focus on a management problem within the Navy, at the
same time that budgetary deliberations were underway. In this
environment the probability is high that DOD and the Navy felt
substantial pressue to settle these claims. From Mr. Diesel's
stated position, it may well be postulated that, at least in one
instance, the timing of claims submissions was calculated to
bring just such pressure to bear. In any event, prior negotiated
agreements with the contractors would have amerliorated some later
congressional concerns, and, in part, reduced some adverse im-
pressions of naval shipbuilding management.
Thirdly, this impression of a lack of singular direction
in shipbuilding management matters was exacerbated by the public
divergence of opinion within DOD over this settlement proposal.
This author is not suggesting that such a divergence of opinion
is unhealthy. Indeed, to the contrary, such divergence is
126

considered quite necessary if any management process is to
remain intellectually honest. Rather, it is suggested that the
public display of such divergence did little to engender con-
gressional support and confidence in this proposal. Assuming
contractor agreements had been reached, the consequences of
this divergence of opinion in DOD could well have resulted in
the failure to obtain congressional approval thereafter. At the
least, it would not have helped in gaining this approval. The
most prudent course of action then would appear to have been the
establishment of a firm, unified position within DOD on the use
of this law prior to notifying Congress of this intended use.
B. SECOND INITIATIVE:- NAVY CLAIMS SETTLEMENT BOARD
1. Background
The unsuccessful attempt at claims settlement through the
use of P.L. 85-804, and the growing dissatisfaction of both the
shipbuilding contractors and DEPSECDEF Clements with the time
required to adjudicate claims through the normal process high-
lighted the pressing need to expedite a resolution to this pro-
blem. As a result, the Navy proposed the establishment of a
special Claims Settlement Board. This proposal was approved by
DEPSECDEF Clements on 8 July, and five days thereafter the NCSB
was formally established by a CHNAVMAT notice. The NCSB '
s
charter granted it the authority for making DOD determinations
on claims subject only to the contractor's appellate rights to
the ASBCA. The original membership of this Board was:
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CAPT W. J. Ryan - Member for business and contractual matters
Mr. J. K. Kominers - Member for legal matters
Later, as the intensity of the NCSB ' s deliberations increased,
this membership would grow, at one point, to about 25 technical
specialists and an equal number of lawyers.
In consonance with its charter, the board operated as an
independent claims settlement authority, free from outside
pressures, influence, or unsolicited advice, approval and con-
currence. Its basic strategy in claims evaluation was, in sequence,
to:
1. Conduct a technical analysis of the claim elements.
2
.
Prepare a legal memorandum to support the areas
of entitlement.
3. Conduct a DCAA audit of the contractor to determine
the allowability of costs
.
After completion of these essential elements of this review
process, an offer to settle would be rapidly developed. There-
after, the contracting officer (NCSB Chairman) , with the
assistance of other board members , would conduct negotiations
with the contractor, and upon agreement, would execute the
necessary contract modifications. If settlements were not
reached, the Chairman would render a final contracting officer
decision pursuant to the Disputes clauses of the pertinent con-
tracts. (The reader is encouraged to compare these procedures
to those delineated in Chapter II for claims settlement teams.)
Exhibit 11 is a summary of the actions taken by the NCSB.
As shown in this exhibit, the initial July 1979 tasking of this
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was to evaluate five of NNSDC claims totaling $742 million.
Final documentation on these claims had been received by the
Navy over the four months immediately preceeding the Board's
establishment. The remaining NNSDC claim, (the CGN 36-37 claim)
was originally submitted in July 1973 for $69 million and was
being evaluated by the SUPSHIPS Newport News organization with
one provisional payment of $15 million being made as a result
of these efforts. In February 1976, NNSDC submitted a follow-on
claim, bringing the total amount claimed against this contract to
$151 million. In late July 1977, CHNAVMAT assigned the CGN 36-37
claim to the NCSB so that an effort could be made to settle the
total claim. A year later, the NCSB settled this claim for $44.3
million.
In March 1977, CHNAVMAT assigned the two GD/EB claims totaling
$544 million to the NCSB, thus bringing the total amount of un-
settled claims assigned to this Board to $1.25 billion. Thus,
all major claims were then being evaluated either by this Board
or the aforementioned claims settlement team evaluating the
Litton/Ingalls claims.
As shown in Exhibit 11, the CGN 36-37 claim was the only
one completely settled by the NCSB. Also as indicated, however,
the Board evaluated and determined entitlement for all the
remaining claims assigned to it. This entitlement process took
slightly over two years for the five remaining NNSDC claims, and
11 months for the GD/EB claims. Entitlement was evaluated at $142
million for the NNSDC claims, and $125 million for the GD/EB
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claims. On completion of these entitlement determinations,
the NCSB was dissolved late in 1978.
2 . Analysis
The establishment of the NCSB represented a centrali-
zation of claims entitlement, negotiation, and settlement
authority. Under the former decentralized procedures, the
appropriate SUPSHIPS organization was responsible for these
functions. However, as shown in Chapter II, these procedures
involved several iterations of review and approval at the MAVSEA
and NAVMAT headquarters level prior to effecting a final settle-
ment. As the need to settle these claims became more pressing,
the many iterations of headquarters review and approval were
eliminated in favor of a centralized final authority, thus sub-
stantially shortening the administrative process associated with
claims settlement.
On the surface it may appear that the NCSB was, at best,
marginally successful. Indeed, such was not the case. The
sheer volume and complexity of the claims evaluated by this
Board was heretofore unprecedented, particularly considering
the timeframe in which these entitlements were accomplished. In
later congressional testimony, both the members of the Armed
Services Committees and high DOD officials were uniform in their
praise of the Board's performance. Further, the establishment
of this board to expedite claims settlement and it's subsequent
performance was a positive indication to the shipbuilders of DOD '
s
sincere efforts to rectify previous problems. Thus, the Board
was generally well received by the shipbuilding industry and was
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an important first step in restoring mutual confidence in the
naval shipbuilding process.
Additionally, for two of the major outstanding shipbuilding
claims, the Board accomplished the necessary, and difficult first
step towards effecting a settlement — the determination of en-
titlement. As shown by the 1976 efforts of DEPSECDEF Clements,
this step is crucial in establishing a government position on
the claims relative to their validity and value. The dissolution
of the NCSP occurred not because of ineffectiveness, but rather,
because, simply, their work had been completed. Thus, the second
claims settlement initiative must be considered a success,
although it did not result in final resolution of the claims.
C. THIRD INITIATIVE: NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 41
In the fall of 1977 ASN (M,RA&L) Hidalgo began separate and
private discussions with top company officials from the three
shipbuilders having major claims. From the outset, Secretary
Hidalgo's approach was to solve the total shipbuilding problem
with these contractors. Obviously the settlement of outstanding
claims was a crucial first step in this process. It is appro-
priate to consider the alternatives encompassed by the total
problem approach prior to proceeding to the claim settlements
themselves
.
1. Analysis of Alternatives
In pursuing a total problem solution approach, the
possibility of a failure to reach a settlement on the claims must





(a) Finish the essels at ther ards
Evaluation of this option indicated that significant
technical, legal, contractual and financial problems would be
encountered, which could delay the completion of construction
by several years. First, there would be a tremendous adminis-
trative problem in inventorying and documenting the millions of
dollars of material associated with each of these constructions.
For the nuclear construction ships, this problem would be exacer-
bated by the stringent safety requirements for component trace-
ability documentation. At the receiving yard (either Navy or
commercial) a large expenditure of funds and time would be necessary
simply to get ready for construction, even assuming that the yard
had the requisite qualifications, and certification for the type
of construction reauired. Should this certification not exist,
the Navy conservatively estimated it would take three years for
any shipyard to attain such a certification. To avoid this delay,
construction at a certified yard would be necessary. Yet the
only shipyards qualified for nuclear construction were precisely
the three contractors which were then experiencing large claims
difficulties and strained relations with the Navv.
Second, should one of these three yards be selected for the
completion of the constructions , undoubtedly that contractor
would face significant problems in building up a qualified
labor force. All three of these yards were having difficulties
obtaining and maintaining a labor force sufficient to meet their
existing contracts with the Navy. Shifting more work to any of
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these contractors would further aggravate these labor problems
.
Third, with the exception of the SSN 688 contracts, each
of the contracts causing claims problems involved a single
contractor constructing a new, unique, and technically complex
class of ships. Therefore, any shifts to a new yard would in-
volve significant delays and expense in the transfer of technology
and documentation between contractors. Learning curve problems
would have to be faced anew with their attendant expense and
uncertainty. The SSN 688 was split between NNSDC and GD/EB
.
These shipbuilders were experiencing considerable difficulties
in meeting their current contractual obligations in constructina
these submarines. Both had experienced schedule slippages and
cost overruns. Thus further overloading either of these yards
with the SSN 688 construction formerly assigned to the other
vard would hardly be conducive to solving the current shipbuilding
problems , or in the best interests of maintaining a healthy,
national nuclear ship construction base.
Fourth, the completion of construction in Naval shipyards
had to be considered. These shipyards had not engaged in ship's
construction since 1967. At that time, and as confirmed by sub-
sequent studies, construction costs in government operated ship-
yards were about thirty percent more than similar constructions
by commercial shipbuilders. Further, the expertise perculiar to
construction would have to re-established in these shipyards.
For instance, Mare Island Naval Shipyard was considered the most
suitable candidate for the re-establishment of nuclear submarine
construction. The repair work scheduled for that yard would have
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to be shifted to other Navy yards, and a capital investment
of about $30 million would be necessary to prepare the Mare
Island yard for construction in lieu of repair work. Further,
the assignment of only three of the SSN 688 submarine construc-
tions would require the yard to increase its labor force by over
3000 persons by the end of FY 1982 and maintain that level through
1984. Additionally, the previously mentioned problems of tech-
nology transfer, documentation, and learning curve difficulties
would also be attendant with construction in a Naval shipyard.
Moreover, to pursue this course of action, the Navy would be
required to significantly expand its technical/managerial base.
Such a move, even if the personnel were available, could hardly
be considered consistent with the existing policies of reducing
the militarv forces, and enhancing the vaiability of the commer-
cial maritime construction base. In any event, this additional
managerial/technical manpower pool was not available within the
Navy. To the contrary, this limited resource was already strained
to meet its existing commitments and pursue the claims settlement
issues as well.
For the foregoing reasons, the completion of construction
in another shipyard could not be considered either cost
effective or timely with respect to planned delivery dates . It
is highly likely that all three major shipbuilders being addressed
herein were well aware of the above considerations when they
employed claim settlement strategies such as work stoppage or




(b) Exercise the Default Clause of the Contract
If the Navy chose to exercise this option, sub-
stantial administrative and legal difficulties could be anti-
cipated. First, the Navy had never exercised such an option in
the past, and thus was neither equipped nor prepared to do so.
This option would entail taking over and managing the completion
of the vessels concerned with the defaulted contract, using the
contractor's facilities. Each of these contractors was con-
currently pursuing more than one construction contract for the
Navy. Therefore, the contractor's facilities would have to be
jointly shared with the contractor himself. The situation would
not be such that the Navy could merely replace the contractor's
managers concerned with the defaulted contractual construction.
Rather, the Naw would have to start from scratch and assemble
a large force of both manaaement and labor. Before any physical
work could begin, the Navy would have to establish a supervisory
organization with an estimating, planning, production control,
quality control, and material management capability sufficient to
identify the precise status of work when it was stopped, and the
effort required to complete the work. Further, the Navy would
have to establish its own procedures for the planning, overseeing,
and inspection of the work itself. Such extensive managerial
capabilities do not exist in the extant SUPSHIPS organizations at
any commercial shipyards. Thus, the technical/managerial resource
constraints addressed in previous sections would also apply to
this option. Moreover, with the contractor's cessation of work
on the defaulted contract, a reduction in his work force would
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become necesary . As noted in Appendix C, the shipbuilding
labor force does not exhibit a large degree of geographic
mobility. Therefore, the Navy, in all likelihood, would have
to draw its labor force from the less skilled labor resources
which had been laid off by the contractor. Undoubtedly the
Navy would then be faced with the types of labor and first
line supervisory problems which plagued both GD/EB and Litton/
Ingalls in the case studies in Chapter III. As shown in these
case studies, these labor problems create an environment which
is counter-productive to cost effective, efficient ship construction
Second, since the contractor's facilities would have to be
jointly shared, scheduling and control oroblems would be inevit-
able. These problems would undoubtedly subject the Naw to future
delay and disruption claims against the contracts which were
still the responsibility of the shipyard owner. This situation
could not be considered conducive to solving the overall claims
problem.
Third, work stoppage had already occurred at Litton/Ingails
and had been threatened or contemplated by both NNSDC and GD/EB.
At Litton/Ingails , construction had continued only through court
order. By pursuing this method of forcing the contractor to
continue work, the Navy may have waived its rights to exercise
the Default clause of the contract. The courts would ultimately
have to decide this issue, thus requiring further litigative
action. Finally, the situation at Litton/Ingails presented a
unique and nettlesome consideration for exercising this option.
Since the State of Mississippi actually owned this facility,
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use of the shipyard by the Navy to complete a contractual
construction raised an interesting legal issue. The potential
existed that this issue would have to be resolved in the
courts prior to the continuation of construction under this
option.
(c) Complete the Vessels Under Court Order
As shown in Chapter II, the Navy had already had
one experience with this option on the LHA contract with Litton/
Ingalls. Although construction was continued, it was at the
expense of complex legal entanglements. The Navy estimated
that another six to ten years of litigative action would have
been necessary to ultimately resolve this issue in the courts,
had settlement not been effected under P.L. 85-804. Further, the
courts decreed that the Navy reimburse the contractor for
actual costs at a rate which was substantially greater than the
original contractual provisions. In the most extreme case, the
Navy would be forced to pay 100% of these costs. This situation
would, in effect, change the contract to a cost type, and provide
little incentive for the contractor to control his costs . More-
over, for the Navy to obtain relief from such a court mandate,
even further legal action would be necessary. Should such relief
not be granted, the ultimate cost of the contract could be sub-
stantially greater than any original estimates. In summary,
the exercise of this alternative potentially places the Navy in
a position of reduced administrative control of the contract,
and thus weakens the Navy's bargaining position with the contractor
in resolving contractual differences of opinion.
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(d) Purchase the Shipyard and Hire a Contractor
The exercise of this option would convert the
affected shipyard into a Government Owned Contractor Operated
(GOCO) facility. ADM Rickover has been a staunch supporter of
this concept. GOCO facilities have long been a reality in other
factions of the weapons systems acquisition arena, such as the
aircraft industry. However, the option of converting any of
these shipyards to GOCO facilities was not without its drawbacks.
First, GOCO arrangements have normally been completed at the
inception of a weapons procurement, not at the mid-point of
an existing contract as a remedial action. Normally these
facilities were built by the government, then procurement con-
tracts were let for the operation of the facilities. In exercising
this option, however, the establishment of a fair purchase price
would be a protracted process and thus would involve some con-
struction delays. Further, the government would have no assurances
that the shipyard owners were even willing to sell. Even if
these owners were willing to sell, the government would be in a
potentially poor bargaining position since this would essentially
be a sole source procurement of the facilities. Therefore, the
potential existed for high profit taking by the seller — a cir-
cumstance which could be just as expensive and protracted as the
claims settlement process itself.
Second, if the facilities were purchased, the matter of
obtaining a contractor to operate the facilities would come to
the fore. As has been highlighted in Chapter III, the current
shipyard owners changed the shipyard management several times
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in their attempts to manage these construction contracts more
effectively. This fact supports the contention that the pro-
bability would be low that a cadre of effective shipyard managers
would be readily available to a commercial contractor. Expressed
another way, a commercial contractor would be faced with the
same technical/managerial problems which would have faced the
Navy under the first two alternatives discussed heretofore. As
well, this contractor would have to contend with the previously
mentioned problems of technology transfer, documentation, and
learning curves, with the consequent delays and expense which
these problems engender.
Third, since the shipbuilding labor pool is essentially
geographically immobile, the new contractor would effectively
be constrained by the same labor market and problems as the
existing contractor.
Fourth, in GOCO arrangements the principal resources available
for a contractor to realize a profit are his management and labor
resources. The contracts under such arrangements are cost type.
Thus the contractor has no incentive to negotiate the lowest
labor rate agreements possible.
Fifth, since the contractor would not own the facilities,
he would not have to be concerned with long term capital investment
decisions such as modernization and equipment replacement. These
decisions require the outlay of substantial funds. Therefore
a contractor unincumbered by these considerations may well have





From the foregoing considerations it is apparent that
shifting to a GOCO arrangement would not be of substantial benefit
in resolving the claims problem, but would require substantial
capital outlays by the government and incur additional delays
in the contracted delivery dates. Further, moving to this
arrangement is a step towards nationalization of the ship-
building industry, and thus runs counter to the basic philosophy
underlying a free enterprise system.
(e) Settle Without P.L. 85-304
Obviously this is the most desirable alternative,
but as discussed in Chapter II, the exercise of this option does
not lie entirely within the purview of the Navy. If the contractors
consider the entitlement determined by the Navy to be inequitable
or unacceptable, it is their option to pursue appeals, and, as a
final measure, litigation to obtain appropriate relief or com-
pensation. As will be seen in subsequent discussions, the con-
tractor's financial status has not small bearing on this de-
termination.
(f) Settle Using P.L. 85-804
This alternative is less desirable than the preceding
one, however, it is preferable to protracted litigations, and
the consequent further deterioration of relations with the ship-
builders .
In summary, analysis of the foregoing alternatives indicates
that if the entitlement findings of the NCSB and the claims
settlement team at Litton/Ingalls were unacceptable to the con-
tractors, the Navy was essentially faced with the option of
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negotiating a settlement under P.L. 85-804 or forcing the
contractor into protracted litigation before the courts.
Herein lies the final initiative to be addressed in this
thesis
.
2 . The Settlements
By February 1978 the NCSB had essentially completed its
determination of entitlement on the GD/EB claims of $544 million.
The following month the claims settlement team completed its
evaluation of the Litton/Ingalls claim. From his ongoing dis-
cussions with both these companies it became apparent to the
ASN (M,RA&L), Secretary Hidalgo, that neither of these firms
would settle for the pure entitlement amounts. Thus, further
negotiations would be mandatory if settlements were to be reached.
This being the case, what role were the entitlement amounts
to be accorded in the ensuing negotiations? The decision was
made that these entitlement amounts would be taken as a given —
that is the government would acknowledge that these entitlement
amounts were due the contractors, and thus would become the basis
for further negotiations. Implicit in this decision was the
necessity to use P.L. 85-804 for any further compensation to
the contractors since a priori the determination of entitlement
established the Navy position on the amount of compensation which
could be granted within the bounds of the existing contracts.
Once the decision had been reached, both the strategy for
exercising the residual powers of P.L. 85-804 and the strategy
for the negotiations themselves were developed. Partially
through a review of Secretary Clements' earlier efforts to
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employ P.L, 85-804, the following key elements of these strategies
were evolved:
(a) No announcement would be made to the Congress concerning
the intent to invoke P.L. 85-804 until proposed settlement
agreements had been reached with the contractors
.
(b) As both the GD/EB and Litton/Ingalls settlements would
require congressional approval, the negotiations and proposed
settlements would be pursued concurrently, but not jointly.
(c) To present a strong rationale for this use of public
funds and thus ameliorate the historical congressional concerns
over "contractor bailouts" which arose when P.L. 85-804 had been
employed in the past, the contractors would have to assume a
substantial fixed loss on these contracts . The reasoning behind
this strategy was that this fixed loss would act as a substantial
impediment to contractors intentionally bidding low on future
government procurements, then attempting to use P.L. 85-80 4 to
realize profits.
(d) No attempt would be made to apportion a specific
degree of blame for the cost overruns to either the contractor or
the government. In subsequent congressional testimony on this
issue, several Navy officials acknowledged that such a deter-
mination of degree of fault could only be determined through the
courts. Averting such a process was, indeed, the goal of pursuing
a negotiated settlement. By mututal agreement, both parties
considered such a settlement in their best interests. Thus, the
critical issues identified in Chapter III became the mutually
agreed upon basis for the negotiations . A review of these
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critical issues would indicate that either both parties were
in part responsible for the cost overruns or that the cause
lay beyond the control of either party.
(e) The determination of the fixed loss accruing to
the contractors would require frank and open discussions of the
contractors' financial status and thus their ability to absorb
these losses without forcing then to face bankruptcy or overly
impairing their ability to continue operations on their current
or future contracts. Such proprietary information is of necessity
closely guarded by any commercial firm. Thus the negotiations
were considered privileged communications between Secretary
Hidalgo and the highest level of contractor officials.
Based on the above key elements, the negotiations for final
settlements with the GD/EB and Litton/Ingalls were intensified
in March 1978.
a. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division
By April 19 78, the new management team at GD/EB
had fixed its losses on the SSN 6 88 contracts at $843 million.
Further GD/EB had informed the Navy that it had $750 million of
claims against these contracts in preparation. Although GD/EB '
s
position during the settlement negotiations remains privileged,
Mr. J. H. Stolarow, Director, Procurement and Systems Acquisition
Division, GAO, provided some insight regarding this firm's
financial status:
In its report to the Navy, Coopers and Lybrand concluded
that. ... General Dynamics could even sustain the entire
$843 million estimated loss and remain solvent if its
lenders would agree to either waive or revise certain
existing minimum loan covenants. Coopers and Lybrand
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did not speculate on the maximum loss General
Dynamics could absorb if the lenders did not agree
to waive or revise the loan covenants
.
Obviously General Dynamics was experiencing a financial
press as it broke off negotiations in March and informed the
Navy of its intention to stop work on these contracts by reason
of losing $16 million per month in unreimbursed costs.
As indicated in Chapter III, the negotiations were continued
and a moratorium was declared on the stop work order. Finally,
on June 9, 1978, these negotiations resulted in the following
proposed settlement:
Total Entitlement $125 million
P.L. 85-804 Settlement $359 million
GD/E3 Fixed Loss $359 million
Total Loss on the Contracts $8^3 million
As an additional provision of this settlement the Navy agreed to
pay GD/EB an immediate progress payment of $300 million to
alleviate EB's severe cash flow problems. This progress payment
was to be amortized over the first year after the settlement.
b. Litton Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding Division
In April 19 78 the claims settlement team completed
its deliberations determining that the total entitlement on
Litton/Ingalls ' $1,088 billion claims was $312 million. Since
the effects of the 1973 contracting officer's decision (see
Chapter III) regarding delay and a provisional payment of $20
million had to be netted out, the claims team analysis indicated




In the subsequent congressional hearings, Mr. J. H.
Stolarow's testimony again provided some insight into the
43parent firm's financial status:
The Navy contracted with the public accounting firm
of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells to analyze the financial
data provided by Litton Industries, Inc., and to orepare
summary comments based on that analysis.
In reports dated June 22, 19 78, and July 20, 1973,
the firm concluded that with respect to Litton 's financial
ability to continue to perform without settlement, it
appears that.... the corporation will exhaust its cash
resources including available borrowing capacity, near
the end of their FY 19 80 (the summer of 19 80)
.
From this revealing testimony it is apparent that Litton/Ingalls
would be approaching dire financial straits fully two years
before the completion of the DD 9 63 construction contract.
On June 9, 19 78, the following proposed settlement agreement
was reached:
Total Entitlement $265 million
P.L. 85-804 Settlement $182 million
Litton/Ingalls Fixed Loss $200 million
Total Loss on the Contracts $647 million
Additionally, the Navy agreed to an immediate provisional payment
of $9 7 million to alleviate Litton/Ingalls cash flow problems,
with this payment being amortized by Litton/Ingalls through
adjustments to future progress payments.
c. Congressional Hearings
On 22 and 2 3 June, Secretary Claytor advised the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, respectively, of his
intent to invoke P.L. 85-804 to effect the above proposed
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settlements. Attached to these letters of intent were the
detailed memoranda of decision for each of these proposed
settlements. Additionally, research indicated that the Navy
conducted extensive informal liaison with Senators, Congressmen,
and members of their staffs.
The general tone of the August 1978 hearings was signifi-
cantly different to that encountered in 19 76 by Secretary Clements
In addition to the well-prepared Navy testimony, Mr. J. H.
Stolarow, representing the GAO
,
presented extensive testimony
which was generally favorable towards the employment of P.L.
85-804. Notably absent from the testimony was any dissenting view
expressed by a member of DOD. In this regard Congressman Bennett
44
noted that:
Since all of us love and admire Admiral Rickover
very much, I was in contact with him about this particular
matter. He has not written and I suggest (ed) oerhaps he
might want to write so it will be clear. But it is my
understanding he approves of this 35-804 proposal that is
before us. That is my understanding of the bottom line....
While some isolated conqressional concerns were expressed,
the general impression gained from the testimony is one of sub-
stantial support for these proposals. This impression was borne
out by Congress not disapproving these proposals within the 60
day period. Thus, these two negotiated settlements became
effective.
d. Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
The circumstances surrounding the negotiations with




CD With the exception of the SSN 6 88 construction
NNSDC had delivered most of the ships involved in the
contracts against which claims were outstanding. This
weakened, but did not obliterate, the consideration of
facilitating the national defense — the prime criterion
for the use of P.L. 85-804.
(2) Leading Naval authorities indicated that NNSDC
was not in an overall financial loss position on these
contracts
.
Recall from earlier discussions in this thesis the congressional
position on this issue was not that shipbuilders were not to
make a profit on their contracts. Rather it was that contractors
would not be guaranteed a profit. Further, consider the central
Navy objective in exercising this third initiative — solving
the overall problem which existed with the shipbuilders
.
In view of these considerations, final negotiations began
with NNSDC in October 1978. The NCSB had completed its deliber-
ations on the $742 million claimed amount with the entitlement
determination of $142 million. Later in October, it was announced
that these claims had been settled for $165 million. The P.L.
85-804 portion of this settlement was about $23 million of which
the ASBCA awarded over $13 million from the determination that
the fringe benefits allowed in a portion of these contracts
had been equitable. The remaining $10 million was awarded under
the residual powers provision.
Thus, the third initiative had resulted in the resolution




The success of this third initiative was the result of
a well-conceived plan which was flawlessly executed. The lessons
of Secretary Clements' earlier attempted settlement were not lost
in the evolution of this plan. First, the plan had a starting
point of an established government position on the claims as
determined through the entitlement process. Second, the decision
to use P.L. 85-804 evolved through careful consideration of the
alternatives. Thus the use of the residual powers under this
Act was in consonance with the historical congressional intent
of enabling public sector management officials to overcome certain
obstacles in the attainment of critical procurement objectives.
(Chapter II is germane.) Third, an agreement was reached with
the contractors through privileged negotiations. This permitted
frank deliberations leading to a mutually agreeable equitable
settlement without resorting to litigation. Finally, the Congress
was informed only after these proposed settlements had been reached.
Thereafter extensive liaison was conducted to fully apprise, in
a timely manner, Congress of the nature and intent of these
agreements. Thus, the public acrimony and congressional skep-
ticism which accompanied Secretary Clements ' earlier attempt was
averted.
Concerning these settlements, Secretary Hidalgo commented
in retrospect that the government-determined entitlement
represented the minimum amount and the contractor's claim
| represented the maximum amount for establishing the negotiation
45
range. In this context the residual powers of P.L. 85-80 4
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becomes the legal vehicle for negotiating a mutually agreeable
and equitable settlement, provided that a prior determination
is made that such a settlement will facilitate the national
defense. Thus, P.L, 85-804, when employed in this fashion,
functions as a necessary and lawful alternative to protracted
litigative actions. Such a functioning was emDloyed very
effectively to finally settle the major shipbuilding claims in
1978.
Exhibit 12 provides an overview of the settlements effected
for the claims arising from the contracts addressed in this
thesis. This overview shows the settlements orior to 1978,
the settlements effected as a result of the efforts delineated
in this chapter, and the claims which contractors had advised
the Navy were forthcoming. The 19 7 8 settlements finally resolved
all the claims shown in this exhibit. As indicated, these
!
claims totaled over $3.6 billion dollars, and were settled for
an average of 36 cents on the dollar. Over 40 percent of these
settlement amounts employed P.L. 85-804 indicating, from another
perspective, that strict entitlement procedures alone were
clearly inadequate to effect a final settlement of these claims.
However, entitlement procedures alone were employed in effecting
the prxor settlements. Further, when viewed in the context of
Secretary Hidalgo's above-delineated comments, entitlement is a
crucial first step in reaching a viable negotiated settlement.
From the foregoing it is concluded that the existing
procedures for settling claims are effective. It must be re-
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739 20.4 564 15.6 1303 35.9
NOTES:
1. This exhibit is based on information available in public records
2. All percentages are expressed as a fraction of the claimed
amount.
3. The prior settlement entitlement for Litton/Ingalls resulted
from the 19 73 contracting officer's decision on changes. The
claimed amount was not available.
Litton/Ingalls 19 78 entitlement includes provisional payments.
Claims not filed includes those claims the contractor announced
to the Navy, but had not completely documented.





When time is of the essence due to national defense consider-
ations, P,L. 85-804 provides a legal and effective method




A review of the major naval shipbuilding claims during
the period from 19 74 to 19 7 8 and the principal initiatives
presented in this study to settle these claims, has led the
author to the following conclusions:
1. Changes in the nature of the shipbuilding industry
have made naval shipbuilders more ready, willing and able
to pursue shipbuilding claims .
During the 1960 's the U.S. shipbuilding industry changed
from one of several small shipyards to one dominated by a
few, conglomerate-controlled, large shipyards. These conglo-
merates have had added resources at their command, larger
management structures, the ability to wield more outside in-
fluence to accomplish corporate goals, a more complex financial
structure, larger constituencies, and thus larger power bases,
more sophisticated management information and planning systems,
and greater financial accountability within their corporate
structure. The conglomerate-controlled shipyards became a
competing division of the parent-conglomerate, with their
new management being financial and management-oriented executives
As a result, these shipyards became less customer oriented,
and more highly profit motivated. Thus, the shipbuilding claims
from these shipyards were filed earlier in the contracted con-
struction process, were broader in scope, often included elements
which were based on more imaginative and thus unproven legal
concepts, and were pursued more vigorously on a more sustained
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and grander scale. The strategies employed in this pursuit
included the application of increased legal and technical
resources; concurrent activity in several claim settlement
arenas, both administratively, and litigatively ; persistent
liaison with and complaints to higher levels of public sector
management, both within DOD and the Congress; either threats
of or actual work stoppage on the contracts; threats of contract
termination; and, finally, extremely effective use of the media
to continually highlight their claim settlement problems.
These conglomerate-controlled shipyards still dominate the
naval shipbuilding market. Thus, the importance of this con-
clusion is that the Navy must remain continually mindful that
it will henceforth be involved with a shipbuilding industry
which can insist on the more timely resolution of shipbuilding
claims settlement issues.
2. Contracting methodologies and changes in weapons system
acquisition policies substantially changed the nature of ship-
building claims .
The contracts which generated the claims addressed in this
thesis were all of the FPI type with escalation. The weapons
system acquisition policies affecting these claims were
evolutionary in nature in that they were attempting to find an
effective means of incorporating the technological boom into
out weapons procurement process. These policies placed increased
responsibilities on the contractor for the design and support
of the weapons system, provided inadequate time for evaluation
between lead and follow ship constructions, and reduced the
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naval/maritime construction base by concentrating extremely
large procurement orders for entire ship classes with, either
one or two contractors, thus overloading their capabilities.
The increased design responsibility of the contractor thrust
both the shipbuilder and the Navy into new contractual roles.
Through schedule slippages and cost overruns neither of these
parties were able to abide by these contractual provisions. The
mutual underestimation of the difficulties in designing and con-
structing these more complex systems caused problems with GFI
,
and GFE at follow ship construction shipyards. The inadequate
time between lead and follow ship procurements with insufficient
evaluative effort prior to the bulk procurements, essentially
visited the problems of research and development on the production
contracts. The FPI contracts proved to inappropriate for these
acquisition policies in that they inadequately compensated the
contractor for his costs in a timely manner, causing severe
cash flow problems and resulting in large claims to obtain
relief from this inequity.
Although the escalation provisions of these contracts had
been in use for many years , they proved inadequate to the task
of coping with the double-digit inflation of the 1970 ' s. This
inadequacy exacerbated the contractors' cash flow problems
through insufficient compensation for the effects of inflation —
a factor over which they had no control.
As a result of the impact of the contracting methods and
types employed, the claims grew to unprecedented proportions,
both in magnitude and complexity. These claims overtaxed the
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Navy's former claims settlement capabilities. This circum-
stance fostered the impression in some quarters of both the
public and private sectors that the Navy was no longer capable
of efficiently and effectively managing its shipbuilding
programs. The pertinent observation here is that although
the settlement of claims certainly could not have prevented
the above events, the more aggressive pursuit of claims settle-
ment could have amelioriated the consequences of these events
to the Navy, particularly with regard to the public perception
of its shipbuilding management capabilities.
3 . The definitive establishment of a clear government
position relative to both the validity and value of the total
claim is a critical first step in claim settlement .
DEPSECDEF Clements' 1976 effort to settle the major ship-
building claims was based on reforming the offending contracts
through substitution of the newer escalation clause. This sub-
stitution would more equitably compensate the contractors for
the effects of inflation. This procedure would have avoided
the lengthy process of entitlement wherein a government position
on all the claim elements would have been established. The
attempt failed because the government could not, through consid-
eration of escalation effects alone,, justify a monetary amount
high enough to adequately compensate the shipbuilders for the
remaining inequities addressed in the claims such as constructive
change orders, delay and disruption. Further, this approach
failed to provide to Congress the necessary assurances concerning
the validity and value of these claims. Such assurances were
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considered necessary by the Congress to insure that this pro-
posed expenditure of public funds was, in fact, in the best
interests of the public weal. Thus, the absolute necessity
of establishing a government position on the total claim
through the entitlement process was reaffirmed.
4. When necessary, the Navy has the capability to sub-
stantially shorten its administrative procedures associated
with claims evaluation .
The July 19 76 establishment of the Navy Claims Settlement
Board represented a centralization of claims entitlement and
negotiation authority. Through this centralization many
former iterations of headquarters review and approval were
eliminated from the claims entitlement and settlement processes.
This streamlined procedure resulted in either the settlement
or entitlement determination of an unprecedented volume of
complex claims from two of the major claimants in from 11 to
26 months. The accomplishment was impressive and was subse-
quently favorably recognized by the Congress, high level DOD
officials, and the shipbuilding industry itself as an important
step towards the resolution of claims.
Its work having been completed, the Board has now been
disestablished. However, the actions of this Board did positively
establish that through centralization of authority the Navy has
the effective capability to foreshorten the entitlement process,
when such actions are appropriate.
5
.
Even, in peacetime, the residual powers authority remains
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a vital and necessarv provision of P.L. 85-804.
These powers enable high, level public sector management
officials to overcome certain obstables in the attainment of
critical procurement objectives. These powers have no equiva-
lent in private sector contracting law. Consequently, when
these powers have been used to settle extremely large claims,
heated controversy at the highest levels of the government
has been the result.
Shipbuilding is the longest, most complex process in the
spectrum of government acquisitions. History verifies that
shipbuilding claims are likely to result from this process
.
Further, the events addressed in this paper show that the very
real potential exists that the entitlement process often does
not establish a compensation amount which equitably reimburses
the shipbuilder for his efforts. Moreover, as shown in this
thesis, the residual powers provide the only means available
to equitably settle these claims short of costly and orotracted
litigation, which can be unacceptably damaging to government-
contractor relationships and counterproductive to the most cost
effective construction of ships in the shortest time.
However, excessive or indiscriminate use of these powers
by public officials could lead contractors to exercise low
bidding strategies to win contracts, with the expectation that
this law will protect them from losses on these contracts.
Therefore, although these residual powers remain an extremely
necessary part of out acquisition process, public officials
in whom these powers reside must exercise, on a continuing
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basis, the keenest sense of managerial judgement in the
application of these powers, as overseen, by the Congress.
6
.
For large, complex shipbuilding claims, negotiation
has proven to be an effective alternative to litigation in
effecting claims settlement .
The final initiative addressed in this thesis resulted in
the settlement of all shipbuilding claims with the three major
contractors concerned. The success of this initiative was in
large measure attributable to well planned and executed
negotiation and congressional approval strategies . The key
elements of these strategies were:
a. A starting government position which was based on
a Navy claims evaluation under the rules of entitlement.
b. The government position that these contractors
would have to absorb a substantial fixed loss on these
contracts to act as an impediment to future contractors
attempting or planning to use this settlement procedure
as a means of recovering their losses or realizing
inordinate profits.
c. Frank and open discussions which were privileged
between the highest levels of contractor and public sector
management, in order to determine an acceptable and equitable
level for the fixed losses to be assumed by each of the
parties
.
d. The establishment of an. agreed upon proposed
settlement prior to congressional notification of the
intent to employ P.L. 85-804.
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e. Thorough informal liaison with key congressional
members in advance of the hearings on the proposed
settlements
.
The success of these negotiated settlements proved that settle-
ments short of litigation were possible. However, these pro-
cedures still take appreciable time, even with the appropriate
employment of P.L. 85-804. These time constraints are driven
by the length of time it takes the contractor to oroperly
prepare and document his claims combined with the time required
by the government to evaluate and establish an entitlement
position on these claims. However, these time constraints
should be viewed from the perspective of the unique nature of
these claims.
The magnitude and complexity of these claims were as unique
as the circumstances which caused them. These circumstances
interfaced an evolutionary weapons acquisition policy with the
conglomerate-controlled shipbuilding industry in an environment
which, for the first time, experienced unforeseen double digit
inflation for protracted periods of time. Thus, it is concluded
that a settlement procedure which resolved the shipbuilding
claims arising from this turbulent environment without recourse
to protracted litigation is indeed an effective one which stands




CHANGES DURING NAVAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION 46
Changes during the process of naval ship construction may
be categorized as contractual or non-contractual, and directed
or constructive. A contractual change is exemplified by a
requirement to correct defective specification, to change
an equipment delivery date or by a conscious decision to change
a specification requirement such as the inspection acceptance
criteria for a welding process . A non-contractual change would
result from the decision of a shipbuilder to procure plumbing
valves of different size and shape than the lead shipbuilder
selected, where the specifications permit such option. A
directed change is one purposely made by the managers of a
program; while a constructive change is one perceived by the
shipbuilder as changing the terms of the contract, but not
recognized as such by the Navy. One example of the latter is
an ambigious specification rigorously interpreted by a Navy
agent, which causes additional work to be done. Directed con-
tractual changes fall under the formal change control procedures
.
All others are not considered contract changes and thus are not
routinely subject to such control. Constructive changes
identified by a shipbuilder and recognized as valid by the
Navy are treated as contractual changes.
Some changes are inevitable as a result of conscious decisions
to develop new weapons capabilities while concurrently building
the ship platform to carry the weapon; e.g., the Polaris program.
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Changes may be necessarily imposed on a program based on
operating experience gained at sea. For example, a casualty in
an operating ship may cause safety changes to be developed for
similar equipment in ships under construction. Changes to
working drawings are frequent during the construction of the
first few ships of a class, as the drawings are revised to
reflect construction experience, correct errors and complete
the iterative process of ship design. If these working drawings
are recognized by the Navy as a Government responsibility such
changes are treated as directed contract changes. If, however,
the contract makes the working drawings the responsibility of
the shipbuilder, contract changes are not in order. Disputes
over such responsibility have been key issues in shipbuilding
claims addressed in this thesis.
Any change to an established shipbuilding plan is disruptive
and usually adds substantially to the expected cost of building
the ship. Changes which affect completed work are most disruptive,
although disruption may occur merely through diverting the
engineering effort from work which has not yet begun. However,
timing is important to this process. If a change is mandatory,
the earlier it is ordered the less disruptive it will probably
be, as this allows the shipbuilder the maximum time for planning,
and most flexibility to select the time to accomplish the change.
A continuing flow of changes is generally disruptive and costly
as it defeats efforts to plan effective use of workforce and
facilities. Large numbers of changes create very difficult
configuration control problems, as it becomes hard to determine
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whether a ship was built to the latest plan revision. Navy-
acquisition policy prescribes deferral of changes not considered
essential to mission capability or safety; unless they can be
accomplished more economically during construction than later,
and with no schedule impact. The policy is easy to abuse,
particularly if the shipbuilder affected needs, or is willing
to accept additional work. In general, however, the lessons of
claims and cost growth in recent years have highlighted the
imperative for increased self-discipline.
Unlike the period discussed in this thesis, today directed
changes are controlled through a configuration control process
as prescribed by an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
policy. When a prospective change, either engineering or non-
engineering is identified by either the government, the ship-
builder or others, such as GFE suppliers, the shipbuilder pre-
pares an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) which demonstrates
the feasibility of the change and assesses its impact in terms
of construction cost as well as life cycle cost and logistic
impact. ECP ' s are evaluated by the Project Manager, who decides
on timing and applicability. For example, an approved ECP may
be planned to be accomplished during construction on ships
where the impact is low, but deferred on earlier ships where
completed work would be affected. Approved ECP ' s are issued in
the form of requests for contract modifications. Preferred
practice is to negotiate a bilateral agreement, fully priced
as to cost and schedule effect. Shipbuilding contracts provide
the Navy the option of ordering a unilateral change in the
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event urgency or the failure to agree on cost requires such.
Increasingly, unilateral changes are used more sparingly, as
the potential for unforeseen additional costs is high.
To some extent concurrency of development and ship construction
is inescapable. Because ship design entails many diverse tech-
nical disciplines, and because of the compactness and complexity
of warship designs, the development of the detail working drawings
is an iterative process, dependent in part on physical completion
of the first ship. The first iteration may produce system dia-
grams which will identify the number and capacity of pumps and
valves for a piping system. After materials of the required
characteristics have been placed under contract by the shipbuilder,
the second iteration would be dimensioned installation
drawings portraying the location and foundationing for the system
components , based on manufacturer ' s data for the materials . A
third iteration would reflect the input of produceability
considerations by the shipbuilders production forces, perhaps
causing relocation of a run of piping to facilitate welding
of joints in the pipe. A fourth iteration might evolve if
construction experience disclosed errors, such as physical
interference with other systems, or inadequate accessibility
for maintenance or operation. These changes manifest them-
selves as drawing revisions, and cause the detail design of
a ship to remain relatively fluid throughout the building of
the first ship. Although the changes encountered may be
necessary, they nonetheless have proved a costly part of ship-
building attendant to new designs.
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If the construction of follow ships has been programmed to
follow too closely on the lead ship, the volume of changes may
affect the follow ships severely. In particular, if follow
ships have been ordered in quantity and the detail design change
rate is still high, the values of series production are lost.
The follow shipbuilder is unable to benefit from the quantity
buy or to manufacture the full contract's worth of parts on one
machine set-up, if the risk of change is high. Some degree of
overlap is practical and effective, as the structural design
can be expected to stabilize when the lead ship is launched,
and other areas on a comparable phased basis through completion.
A second area of concurrent development and construction
which is frequently mandated by evolving military threat, is
that of weapon systems design and integration. With earlier,
less complex weapon systems it had been possible to treat the
platform and the weapon separately, so that weapon installations
did not pace the ship construction. As weapons systems capability
and complexity has increased, the design and construction of
ship and system as an integrated whole becomes more significant,
and the effects of concurrent development and construction are
now recognized to carry a high potential for disruption, claims,
and the resulting cost growth.
Within the above framework, the following related terms
are defined.
Directed change - Formal deliberate changes, ordered in
writing by a contracting officer, in the
form of either a bilateral contract
modification (which establishes mutual




Bilateral modifications may be fully
priced supplemental agreements with future
claims release provisions, or they may be
partially priced with the proviso that
some element of equitable adjustment (i.e.,
delay or disruption) is to be resolved later
Delay Costs - That additional cost which accrues to a
contractor due to the slippage or delay





That additional cost which accrues to a
contractor due to Navy-induced inefficiencies
in unchanged work resulting from a change.
A course of conduct (actions, inactions,
and written or oral communications) by
a contracting officer or authorized
representative which causes a shipbuilder
to perform additional or different work





Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute
concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which
is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the
Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing
and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor.
The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and
conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of
such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the
Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary.
The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized repre-
sentative for the determination of such appeals shall be final
and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or
arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In
connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and
to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final
decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed
diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance
with the Contracting Officer's decision.
This 'Disputes' clause does not preclude consideration of
law questions in connection with decisions provided for in the
paragraph above: Provided , that nothing in this contract shall
be construed as making final the decision of any administrative





LABOR IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
By comparison with other major industries, the shipbuilding
industry is extremely labor intensive. A large portion of the
workforce is comprised of craftsmen such as welders, shipfitters,
and electricians.
Exhibit 13 shows a more specific breakdown of this labor
force .
EXHIBIT 13






Source: Martin, John C., The Labor Market of the
United States Shipbuildina Industrv,







Exhibit 14 compares the weekly earnings of production workers
in the shipbuilding industry to those in the contract construction
industry. As shown, with the exception of 196 3, the earnings
for shipbuilding workers has always lagged behind those in the
contract construction industry. Commencing in 196 4, a trend of




WEEKLY EARNINGS OF PRIVATE SHIPBUILDING







struction vs. Private Shipbuilding
Dollars Percent
1960 $113.04 $110.43 $ 2.61 2 . 3%
1961 118.08 117.20 .88 0.8
1962 122.47 121.60 .87 0.7
1S63 i27.19 127.92 (.73) (0.6J
1964 132.06 128.21 3.85 2.9
1965 138.38 127.98 10.40 7.5
1966 146.26 137.78 8.48 5.8
1967 154.95 139.32 15.63 10. 1
1968 164.49 144.99 19.50 11.9
1969 181.54 155.07 26.47 14.6
1970 195.45 158.00 37.45 19.2
1971 211.67 162.74 48.93 23.1
1972 222.51 172.66 49.85 22.4
1973 235.69 178.41 57.28 24.3
1974 249.08 189.74 59.34 23.8
1975 265.35 217.09 48.26 18.2
1976 284.56 247.33 37.23 13.1
Source: Department of Labor, Rureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings,
United States, 1909-1975
,
Bulletin 1312-10, Washington, D.C., 1976, and
Employment and Earnings^ Washington, D.C., March 1976 and March 1977.
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The greatest percentage difference occurred in 1973, when
contract construction workers earned almost 25 percent more
than their shipbuilding industry counterparts. Also, it may
be observed that the shipbuilding industry pay scale tends
to lag that of the contract construction industry by two to
three years. Essentially both of these industries compete for
the same local labor skills. Thus, the conclusion to be drawn
from this pay differential between the two industries is
obviously that the shipbuilding industry labor force will be
the least stable of the two.
Working conditions in the shipbuilding industry always has
been far less desirable than those in many other manufacturing
industries. These more adverse working conditions may explain,
in part, the high turnover rates shown in Exhibit 15.
EXHIBIT 15
Monthly Turnover Rates in Selected Industries: 1976
Rate of Change Per 100 Employees per Month
Industry Accessions Separations Turnover
Private Shipyard 6.7












In 19 73, shipbuilders indicated that their work force was
traditionally comprised mainly of two groups: a relatively
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stable cadre of skilled workers, and a large number of less
skilled laborers who work on a highly irregular basis. Some
employees in this latter group go through a "hire and quit"
cycle as many as four times in a single year.
This high turnover rate is generally considered to be the
result of the shipyard's labor demands expanding beyond the
available local labor pool. Another factor affecting this
personnel stability problem is the need to maintain a balance
between skills required by the manufacturing process and the
skills available in the work force itself. Should such an
imbalance occur to such a degree that it cannot be corrected
by shipyard management's actions (such as rescheduling work)
,
it becomes necessary to hire and fire the skilled laborers.
Such upheavals in this critical manpower resource is more
damaging to shipyard productivity than the hiring and firing
of unskilled labor.
Regarding shipbuilding labor mobility, a recent study
conducted by George Washington University indicated that only
9.1 percent of private shipyard's 1965 labor force had moved
to another state by 1970. Shipbuilders generally confirmed
this low mobility rate with the observation that employees
who are separated seldom move to another area where industry
expansion is being experienced. Rather, skilled laborers
seek employment in another local industry. Thus the pool of
skilled manpower available to any given shipyard is essentially
restricted to the workers in the local area. Therefore, ship-
builders are not generally able to expand their workforce without
171

undertaking substantial and expensive training efforts. This
problem is particularly acute in labor skill areas which require
frequent recertification/requalification such as high pressure
welders
.
During the 1978 Naval Ship's Procurement Process Study,
shipbuilders were asked the question, "Given your current
facilities, what total manning level would you ideally choose
for operating your shipyard with a continuous stable workload?"
The two shipyards under consideration in this thesis responded
as follows
:
a. General Dynamics/Electric Boat - 25,000 personnel.
b. Litton/Ingalls - 18,000 personnel.
These responses, of course, reflect the wisdom of hindsight but
may serve as a bench mark for the manpower perturbations
addressed in Chapter III. It should be born in mind, during
the timeframe of this thesis, however, that both these shipyards
were either increasing their facilities to their present size
or learning to more efficiently utilize their recently expanded
capabilities. Further, their workloads were not stable, but
rather, were increasing appreciably. From these considerations,
and the foregoing discussion of the shipbuilding labor industry,
it is clear that these two shipbuilders were in an extremely unstable
labor environment, with excessive rates of growth, and higher
than optimum employment levels. This environment taxed their
management abilities, lowered their productivity, and thus





SUMMARY OF LITTON/INGALLS ADMINISTRATIVE/LITIGATIVE ACTIONS 48
This appendix summarizes the general nature of the adminis-
trative and litigative actions arising from the LHA and DD-96 3
contracts with Litton/Ingalls . Where no status or disposition
is indicated, the cases were in a suspended state at the time
of the final P.L. 85-804 settlement in 1978.
A. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
1. Appeal of Litton Systems, Inc ., ASBCA Number 18214
Filed: March 2, 19 7 3
Subject : Appeal from decision of the contracting
officer dated February 28, 19 73, denying request
for increase in the contract ceiling price in the
amount of $475.5 million. The dollar amount of
this claim, as revised, is now $1,083 billion.
History : In January 1976, Litton and the Navy
entered into a stipulation filed with the ASBCA to
suspend without prejudice the major part of this
claim. In 1977, the Navy attempted to reinstate
ASBCA 18214 as an active appeal. On September 30,
1977, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi expressed its view that reinstatement
of the appeal would impinge upon litigation pending
before that court.
Status : Proceedings are still suspended.
2. Appeal of Litton Systems, Inc. , ASBCA Number 18214
Subject : Claim in excess of $22 million for interest
on deficiency in progress payments.




condition that the Navy "advance and pay" to Litton
its actual construction costs for labor and materials
through a 9-month period, ending in April 19 77. The
order was clarified on November 23, 19 76, to require
Navy to pay Litton 91 percent of the costs incurred
in constructing the LHA's in this period. On April
19, 19 77, over the objection of the Government, the
District Court extended the preliminary injunction
to October 31, 1977. Just before expiration of this
period, the Court again, on October 26, 1977, con-
tinued the preliminary injunction to July 31, 1978.
A month later, on November 22, 1977, upon joint
motion of the parties, the District Court reduced
the 91 percent payment rate to 75 percent until
April 1, 1978, at which time the rate is to revert
to 91 percent.
Status : Litton and the Department of Justice pre-
sented a joint motion before the court to make the
75 percent cost reimbursement a permanent injunction.
The motion was approved by the court.
2. United States vs. Litton Svs terns , Inc.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, Case
Number 77-2431.
Initiated : June 17, 19 77
Subject : Appeal by the Government to the Court of
Appeals from the April 19, 19 77, order of the Dis-
trict Court requiring the Navy to continue to re-
imburse Litton for 91 percent of its costs for
construction of the LHA's, in excess of the contract
ceiling price.
Status: Briefs have been filed by the parties.
Court of Claims
1 . Litton Systems, Inc., vs. United States
Court of Claims Case Number 4 33-76
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3. Appeal of Litton Systems, Inc ., ASBCA Number 21728
Filed : Letter of Appeal (undated) received January
17, 1977.
Subject : Appeal from the decision of the contracting
officer denying claim for cost of delays involved
in repair order under insurance clause in LHA-1 and
LHA-2.
Status : On January 13, 19 78, the Government requested
leave to amend its answer
4. Appeal of Litton Systems, Inc ., ASBCA Number 21334
Subject : Appeal from decision of the contracting
officer directing modification to Combustion Control
Air System at no cost to the Government.
Status : On August 13, 1976, Litton requested a 45-
day extension to file complaint. As of February 18,
1978, the Recorder's Office, ASBCA, has no record
that a complaint was ever received. Navy's Office
of General Counsel has stated that an indefinite
extension was granted.
B. U. S. District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals
1 . United States vs. Litton Systems, Inc .
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, Case Number S-76-137(C)
Initiated : July 19 76
Subject : Action by the Government for specific
performance following Litton ' s. notification of its
intent to stop work June 1976 on LHA construction.
Action is to require Litton to continue to perform
its responsibilities under the LHA contract, (i.e.,
build the ships)
.
History : The District Court imposed a preliminary
injunction by order of August 3, 19 76. The order
enjoined Litton Systems, Inc., and Litton Industries
from failing or refusing to construct the LHA ' s on
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Filed : October 22, 1976
Subject : Suit by Litton for breach and reformation
of LHA contract.
Status : Litton describes this as a "protective
case" covering all matters before the ASBCA, to be
pursued if Litton loses on the claims before the
ASBCA.
2 . Litton Systems, Inc., vs. United States
Court of Claims Case Number 20 3-76
Filed : May 21, 19 76
Subject : Appeal from a decision of the Navy Contract
Adjustment Board for LHA contract reformation with
respect to amounts claimed as due as a result of the
earlier cancellation of four LHA vessels.
Status : In discovery proceedings
D. Navy Contract Adjustment Board
In June 19 74 Litton petitioned the Board for
reformation of the LHA Contract to allow payment of
costs incurred incident to cancellation of LHA's
6-9 in excess of the "ceiling" under the Contract
of $109.7 million. The Board denied the petition
in June 1975, finding that the ceiling provision
reflected the intentions of the parties and was




1. Wh.iteh.urst, Clinton E. , Jr., "Is There a Future for
Naval Shipyards?", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, April 1973,
p. 35.
2. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Seapower Subcommittee, Current Status of Shipyards, 19 74
, Part 2,
Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., GPO,
1974.
3. Ibid, p. 934.
4. Ibid, p. 1012-1013.
5. Direct fiscal assistance for the construction of merchant
ships in U.S. commercial shipyards is provided through a con-
struction differential subsidy (CDS) . This CDS was established
by Title V of the Merchant Marine Act of 19 36 and later expanded
by the amendments in the Marchant Marine Act of 1970. Essentially
CDS allows a U.S. firm to construct a vessel in a U.S. shipyard
at a cost which is equivalent to that for constructing the same
vessel in a foreign yard. CDS payment is directly from the govern-
ment to the private yard. The intent of these laws is to en-
courage growth and maintenance of the U.S. maritime industry thus
ensuring a degree of national self sufficiency of these industries
.
Sloan School of Management, MIT Technical Report No. 1, The
United States Shipbuilding Industry and Influences of Conglomerates
,
by Gary L. Kavanagh, June 1977.
6
.
There are two general types of contracts in government
procurement - cost reimbursement and fixed-price. The majority
of the shipbuilding claims which were at issue during these
hearings were filed by firms having fixed-price contracts for
ship construction. Under a fixed price contract the contractor
guarantees performance of the terms of the contract. In exchange
for this consideration, the government obligates itself to pay a
specified price. This type of contract is normally used when
construction costs are reasonably well established and uncertainties
are minimal, thus enabling the contractor, within reasonable
limits, to establish a price that is fair to him both in terms of
construction costs and profit. The majority of the construction
risks obviously lie with the contractor in this type of contract.
By contrast, the cost-reimbursable contract (of which the "cost-
plus" referred to by Admiral Rickover is a subcategory) obligates
the government to pay reimbursable and allowable costs under the
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